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THE NEED FOR STATUTORY PROTECTION
FROM SEIZURE FOR ART EXHIBITIONS:
THE EGON SCHIELE SEIZURES
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
MAJOR MUSEUM EXHIBITIONS
Alexander Kaplan*

INTRODUCTION

Art theft has been a perpetual plague on the art market and
increasingly has become one of the most profitable forms of illegal
trade.' In recent decades the art world has witnessed an increase
in claims for repatriation of stolen antiquities2 and lawsuits for the

* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2000; B.A., State University of New York
at Albany, 1994.
"Art theft has probably been with us for almost as long as there has been
art." See Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable
Balance Between Rights of Former Owners and Good FaithPurchasersof Stolen
Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 49, 49 (1995). Art theft is the third most profitable
form of illegal trade, following drug smuggling and arms trading, with estimated
profits of $2 billion a year. Id. at 49 & n.2.
2 See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg
& Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that
the Republic of Cyprus could recover four sixth-century mosaics that had been
stolen from a Cypriote Church and bought by an American collector); Republic
of Turk. v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(following settlement, the Republic of Turkey recovered from the collection of
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York a cache of more than 300 ancient
artifacts called the Lydian Hoard, which had been excavated from burial grounds
in Turkey and exported to the United States in contravention of Turkish law).
See also Lawrence M. Kaye, The Future of the Past: Recovering Cultural
Property, 4 CARDOzO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 23 (1996) (discussing efforts and
recent cases involving the recovery of antiquities).
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return of stolen artwork in the hands of good faith purchasers.3
Currently, an intense interest has developed in the return of artwork
to families of European Jews whose cultural possessions were
looted by the Nazis during World War IH.4 These acts of plunder,
' A good faith purchaser is one "who buys without notice of circumstance
which would put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry as to the title, or as
to an impediment on the title, of a seller." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th
ed. 1990). To determine whether a buyer is a good faith purchaser, courts
examine several factors "to determine whether the purchaser knew that the seller
lacked title, or whether an honest and careful purchaser would have had doubts
with respect to the seller's capacity to transfer property rights, and if so, then
whether the purchaser reasonably inquired about the seller's ability to pass good
title." Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affid, 917 F.2d 278,
279 (7th Cir. 1990). See Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d
1150, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that the Federal Republic of Germany
could recover two Albrecht Dtirer portraits from a New York collector who had
bought the works in good faith from an American soldier who had stolen them
from a German castle during World War II); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found.
v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 427 (N.Y. 1991) (finding that the Solomon R.
Guggenheim Museum in New York could recover a Marc Chagall gouache that
had been stolen from the museum by a mailroom employee, sold to a gallery,
and subsequently bought by an unsuspecting couple).
' Elaine L. Johnston, Cultural Propertyand World War II: Implicationsfor
American Museums-PracticalConsiderationsfor the Museum Administrator,
SC40 ALI-ABA 29, 32 (1998). Looting and coercive transfers of art during the
period of the Nazi party's rise to power in 1933 to the conclusion of World War
II in 1945 occurred at unprecedented levels. Id. at 31. The Nazis unlawfully
seized millions of objects from Jewish individuals and other Holocaust victims,
public and private museums and galleries, and religious and educational
institutions throughout Europe. Id. In France, for example, with the cooperation
of the occupied Vichy government, Adolph Hitler and Herman Goering
personally selected art objects for themselves. The Restitution of Art Objects
Seized by the Nazis from Holocaust Victims and Insurance Claims of Certain
Holocaust Victims and Their Heirs: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 2 (1998) [hereinafter House Holocaust
Hearings] (opening statement of James A. Leach, Chairman, House Banking and
Financial Services Committee). Entire inventories of museums were removed and
some of the greatest private collections of such collectors as the Rothschilds were
expropriated and sold off. Id.
Art had never assumed such a principal role in the ideology of war in
Western history. See Stephen K. Urice, World War 11 and the Movement of
Cultural Property: An Introduction and Brief Bibliography for the Museum
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generally viewed as theft under principles of American and
international law, give rise to claims by the families of the
dispossessed for restitution of their stolen property.'
Restitution cases involve returning possession and good title to
works of art to the original, dispossessed owners. 6 A stolen work

Administrator,SC40 ALI-ABA 1, 4 (1998) (citing generally JONATHAN GEORGE
PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH (1996)). Also unprecedented was the Nazi army's inclusion of well-trained specialists whose missions
were to obtain and safeguard transportable works of art. See Urice, supra, at 4.
Luckily, although for a despicable objective, the professionalism of the Nazi
pillagers saved most of the treasures of Europe for today. See Urice, supra, at
4. Following the surrender of Germany, Allied forces, through extraordinary
efforts recovered most of the objects from Germany and the occupied territories.
See Johnston, supra, at 32. Art experts were assigned to each of the Allied
occupation units at special collection points to sort out the uncovered paintings,
sculptures and other works hidden by the Nazis in castles, bunkers and churches.
See House Holocaust Hearings, supra, at 2 (opening statement of James A.
Leach, Chairman, House Banking and Financial Services Committee). Vast
numbers of works were returned to their owners, or the heirs of those who had
not survived the Holocaust, or repatriated to the countries they were removed
from. See Johnston, supra, at 32. However, by the mid-1950s, the formal
recovery and return effort ceased and many thousands of objects remain missing
today. See Johnston, supra, at 32. See also generally LYNN H. NICHOLS, THE
RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND

(1994) (providing an in-depth study of the Nazi pillage
of European art).
5 See Johnston, supra note 4, at 31. The Hague Convention of 1907, to
which Germany, the United States and most other Allied nations were parties,
prohibited, inter alia, pillage, confiscation and seizure of works of art. See
Johnston, supra note 4, at 31 n.2 (citing the Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; 1 Bevans 631). The
Allies also issued a declaration reserving the right to invalidate any transfer of
art in the territories occupied by the Axis powers. See Johnston, supra note 4, at
31 n.2.
6 Good title refers to "[t]itle which is free of defects and litigation and hence
may be transferred to another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at
1486. Possession means "having control over a thing with the intent to have and
to exercise such control." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 897.
Thus, a good faith purchaser or a possessor may have physical control over an
object of art but may not hold good title to the object if it is stolen property.
Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 429. Upon demand, the original owner may
have the right to recover the work from the good faith purchaser in a court
SECOND WORLD WAR
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of art generally rejoins the art market, where a good faith purchaser, unaware of the work's history of theft, buys the tainted work.7
Frequently, a stolen work embarks on a chain of ownership
transfers from the thief to the current possessor. With each transfer,
evidence of the initial theft becomes more obscure.8 Although a
museum has been the good faith purchaser in some restitution
disputes, the disputed work in such a case has been part of the
museum's permanent collection, rather than on loan for a temporary exhibition. 9
Recently, the museum community was shaken when the New
York County District Attorney ("District Attorney") issued a
subpoena duces tecum1° to the Museum of Modem Art in New
York ("MOMA") 11 to seize two paintings exhibited in the fall of
1997, which were part of a three-year worldwide tour of the

proceeding. Id.
7 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 49 (describing the typical path of a stolen
work of art).
' "Stolen works are generally 'laundered' through a series of sales to buyers
with progressively less knowledge of the object's taint." Thomas W. Pecoraro,
Choice of Law in Litigation to Recover National Cultural Property: Efforts at
Harmonization in Private InternationalLaw, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1990).
9 See Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 428 (noting that a stolen Chagall
gouache had been part of the Guggenheim Museum's collection since it was
donated in 1937). In Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art purchased the Lydian Hoard for its permanent
collection, although the Museum kept most of the 300 artifacts in storage rather
than on display. See Kaye, supra note 2, at 28 (citing Republic of Turk. v.
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), describing
further the Museum's possession of the artifacts).
'0 "A 'subpoena' is a process of a court directing the person to whom it is
addressed to attend and appear as a witness in a designated action or proceeding
in such court .... A subpoena duces tecum is a subpoena requiring the witness
to bring with him and produce specified physical evidence." N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 610.10 (McKinney 1995).
" The Museum of Modem Art was founded in 1929 and holds over 100,000
works dating from the 1880s to the present. See House Holocaust Hearings,
supra note 4, at 174 (statement of Glenn D. Lowry, Director, Museum of
Modem Art, New York). Over 1.5 million people visit MOMA each year, many
to see special exhibitions. See House Holocaust Hearings,supra note 4, at 174
(statement of Glenn D. Lowry).
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Austrian expressionist Egon Schiele.' 2 The heirs of two European
Jews claimed ownership to the paintings, which they alleged the
Nazis had looted from their ancestors during the annexation of
Austria in World War 11.13 Reverberations of the subpoena and
ensuing litigation spread throughout the art world. The news jolted
New York museums and lenders around the globe, with the former
fearing their ability threatened to continue first-class exhibitions,
and the latter concerned about the extent to which their artwork

12

Egon Schiele was an Austrian Expressionist who lived from 1890-1918.

See MAGDALENA DABROWSKI, EGON SCHIELE: THE LEOPOLD COLLECTION,
VIENNA 6 (1997). During his brief career, the artist was prolific, producing more
than 3,000 works on paper and executing approximately 300 paintings. Id.
Though he lived only 28 years, and his artistic career spanned merely 10, Schiele
is one of the most important Austrian artists of the early twentieth century. Id.
Schiele was a founder of Austrian Expressionism, an artistic movement that
"rejected the conventional concept of beauty and introduced the element of
ugliness and exaggerated emotion as the fundamental traits of its pictorial
language." Id. The difficult subject matter, often sexually explicit and highlighting the tragic, made the artist's work "underappreciated outside his home
country." Id. As a result, his principal patrons were Austrian collectors. Id.
Today, most of Schiele's work remains in Viennese public and private
collections. Id.
13 The claimants are relatives of Lea Bondi and Fritz Grunbaum, both
Austrian Jews who lost their works during the Nazi occupation of Austria during
World War II, and are seeking the return of "Portrait of Wally" and "Dead City
III," respectively. See infra note 11 (describing the claimants' communication
with MOMA seeking help in the return of the Schiele paintings). This Note does
not consider the veracity of the claimants' allegations of their right to title of the
disputed works, although the trial court's opinion raises some doubts as to the
merits of the claimants' positions. See In re Application to Quash Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d
872, 881 n.12 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd, mot. denied sub nom. People v. Museum
of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16,
1999). See also Judith H. Dobrzynski, Ownership Conflict Tests Art Seizure Law,
ORANGE COuNTY REGISTER (Cal.), Jan. 25, 1998, at F32 [hereinafter
Dobrzynski, Ownership Conflict] (reporting that a relative of one of the claimants
may have sold the painting to a Swiss gallery, thus making the lender's purchase
of the work lawful). But see Judith H. Dobrzynski, A Singular Passionfor
Amassing Art, One Way or Another, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at El
[hereinafter Dobrzynski, A SingularPassion] (stating that the exhibitor may have
bought the other disputed work knowing, yet ignoring that it was the property of
one of the claimants).
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would be protected while on exhibit in New York. 14 The subpoena
unsettled the extent of protection for exhibits because it appeared
to override a section of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs
Law15 that had safeguarded loans like the Schiele exhibition for
the past thirty years.
Section 12.03 of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
("ACAL") contains an Exemption From Seizure provision, which
protects works of art loaned to non-profit exhibitions from "any
kind of seizure ...

for any cause whatever."' 16 This provision had

never been challenged in court.17 Based upon the statute's surrounding language and legislative history,18 the District Attorney
interpreted the statute not to include seizures for criminal investigations and therefore subpoenaed MOMA to produce the paintings.19
MOMA successfully moved to quash the subpoena, 20 decided by
the New York Supreme Court in In re Application to Quash Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modem
Art2' ("Schiele Case"). In the Schiele Case, the court disagreed
with the District Attorney's interpretation of the law and granted
the motion.22 However, this success was short lived. While

14

For instance, leading European museums declared that "[t]he actions of

the Manhattan District Attorney have shaken our confidence in the worth of the
Exemption from Seizure laws both at the state and at the federal level. European
museums require reassurance on this point, if they are to lend again to
exhibitions in the United States." Brief for Respondent at 30 n.24, People v.
Museum of Modem Art, 1999 WL 145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16,
1999) (No. 28012-98).
'" N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999). See infra Part
I.B for text of statute.
16 Id.
17 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 872
(noting that the statute "has never been the subject of court scrutiny").
18 See infra notes 120-123 (discussing the District Attorney's arguments).
19 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 872, 875.
20 See infra notes 117-119 (discussing MOMA's arguments in support of its
motion to quash).
21 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd, mot. denied sub nom.
People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *1 (N.Y.
App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
22 Id. at 881. See infra Part II, discussing the trial court's decision.
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MOMA remained in possession of the paintings,23 the District
Attorney appealed the ruling.24 In New York v. Museum of
Modem Art,25 the Appellate Division of the State of New York
for the First Department reversed the trial court, finding the statute
not to immunize loans seized pursuant to criminal investigations.
MOMA intends to appeal the ruling.26

The controversy over the extent of protection provided by the
ACAL arises in the broader context of the legal system's approach
to whether the good faith purchaser of stolen artwork or the
original owner should have the legal right to ownership. Common
law and civil law nations take opposite approaches to this dilemma.
Civil law nations generally favor the good faith purchaser under a
policy fostering commercial certainty, whereas the United States
and other common law nations generally award the artwork to the
victim of the theft. 27 New York law is particularly sympathetic to
the original owner, in an effort to thwart the stolen art market.28
Although the ACAL does not award possession of a disputed
work of art to either the possessor or the claimant, nor does it
prevent a claimant from bringing a suit for replevin,29 the law

23

Upon issuance of the subpoena, the District Attorney and MOMA reached

an agreement "which culminated in an understanding that the museum will
maintain custody of the paintings until the conclusion of litigation over the
subpoena." Brief for Appellant at 5, People v. Museum of Modem Art, 1999 WL
145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999) (No. 28012-98).
24 See Brief for Appellant, Museum of Modern Art (No. 28012-98).
25 No. 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999),
rev'g In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on
the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (Sup. Ct. 1998).
26 See Bill Alden, Panel Orders Museum to Give Up Paintings, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 17, 1999, at 1 (reporting that a MOMA spokeswoman stated that "the
museum intended to appeal the panel's ruling").
27 See infra notes 163-164 (describing the differences between the common
law and civil law approaches to the transfer of stolen chattels).
28 See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431
(N.Y. 1991) (holding that New York law should not "encourage illicit trafficking
in stolen art"). See also infra note 166 (describing further New York law).
29 See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999). Replevin
is "an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or
chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully
distrained or taken or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels." BLACK'S
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may make a claimant's recovery efforts more difficult by prevent-

ing a claimant from seizing a work temporarily loaned to a New
York museum. 30 Thus, by interpreting the ACAL to prohibit
seizures pursuant to criminal investigations, the statute appears to
run against the grain of New York law by not favoring victims of
art theft. However, this Note argues that the statute reflects a
legislative policy choice that, in the words of the trial court, it is
"in the state's best interest to protect cultural institutions and their
ability to encourage the exchange of art for the benefit of the entire
populace over the needs of a few individuals to recover their art,
even if the art was stolen.",3 1 While this stance seems harsh to
victims of art theft, and particularly to those of the Holocaust, this
Note contends that unequivocal exemption from seizure under the
ACAL will not prove detrimental to a claimant's recovery efforts.
The ACAL can prohibit seizures pursuant to criminal investigations without jeopardizing a claimant's recovery efforts because the
potential pernicious effects of the statute on victims of art theft
should be mitigated by the recent rise in interest and efforts in
returning stolen artwork to its rightful owners. Museums and the art
community currently are increasing their awareness of, and

improving policies concerning, the acquisition and display of stolen
artwork.32 Concurrently, various organizations have developed,
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1299.

As one critic of the Schiele Case has argued, foreclosing seizure under the
premise that a claimant may seek remedy abroad is a "flawed idea [because]
[t]he foreign state to which an artwork in controversy is allowed to return may
permanently foreclose recapture, leaving a claimant no mechanism to assert
ownership." Daniel J. Bender, Case Commentary, In re Application to Quash
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 119 (1998).
31 In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on
the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 879 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd, mot.
denied sub nom. People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999 WL
145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
32 Several directors of America's most prominent museums recently testified
before Congress as to their commitment to measures to investigate the
provenance of every work in their collections. See House Holocaust Hearings,
supra note 4, at 8, 10. Philippe de Montebello, Director, Metropolitan Museum
of Art, New York, speaking for the Association of Art Museum directors, stated
that museums are "committed to a process of more directed research, continued
30
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and are improving, computer databases that museums can consult
when considering works for exhibition.33 Additionally, in the
wake of recent ownership disputes between a good faith purchaser
and a victim of art theft, several alternative dispute resolution
proposals have surfaced to resolve claims for stolen art work.34

Finally, increasing pressure resulting from congressional and
international action to right the wrongs of the Holocaust should
assist a claimant in recovering stolen artwork displayed at a
museum exhibition without resort to seizure.35
36
This Note analyzes the New York and federal statutes
vigilance, and to the enhanced use of new technologies in order to access records
as they become available." See House HolocaustHearings, supra note 4, at 10.
Even Sotheby's, the inveterate auctioneer, now attends conferences on Holocaustera art and scrutinizes its auction catalogue for objects that may have been looted
by the Nazis. See David D'Arcy, Sotheby 's Takes Lead on War Loot Issue, ART
& AUCTION, Feb. 15, 1999, at 28. This is a significant sign indeed of increased
diligence in avoiding trade in Holocaust-tainted art, as Sotheby' s traditionally had
been slow to "acknowledge the legitimacy of claims concerning property slated
for sale." Id.
" See infra Part III.A, discussing the recent progress in developing computer
databases to track and record stolen art.
14 See infra Part III.B, discussing various alternative dispute
resolution
proposals suggested in response to recent ownership disputes over stolen artwork.
15 In the United States, Congress recently enacted the Holocaust
Victims
Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 (1998) which, inter alia,
encourages all governments to help to return property stolen by the Nazis to
victims of the Holocaust. See infra notes 201-204 and accompanying text
(discussing the Act). Other nations are seeking to make reparations to Holocaust
victims as well. The Austrian government currently is undertaking efforts to
return cultural property in possession of national museums to Holocaust victims.
See infra note 227 (describing Austria's actions). In 1998, Swiss banks agreed
to pay $1.25 billion to Jewish groups to settle Holocaust-related lawsuits. See
Barry Meier, Jewish Groups Fightfor Spoils of Swiss Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 1998, at Al. In December 1998, representatives of 44 countries met in
Washington and agreed to produce a master list of artwork stolen by the Nazis
"as part of an international effort to attain justice for the victims of financial war
crimes." Brigid O'Hara Forster, What Has Been Looted? The West's Art
Museums Face a Daunting Task as They Search for the Remnants of Nazi
Pillaging, TIME, Mar. 15, 1999, at 58.
36 See Immunity From Seizure Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (1994), discussed infra
Part I.A. MOMA chose not to apply for federal protection, believing it to be a
time-consuming process, and presumed that the New York statute would afford
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protecting works of art on loan to exhibits from seizure, and
discusses the importance of these laws in providing art loans with
full exemption from seizure to ensure the stability and success of
major museum exhibitions in New York.37 While arguing for the
need for comprehensive statutory protection from seizure, this Note
recognizes and addresses the rights of victims of art theft to
concrete means of recovery and compensation. Part I of this Note
introduces the federal and New York statutes and analyzes the
legislative history and underlying policy concerns of the laws. Part
I advances several arguments maintaining that the purpose of the
New York statute is to insure complete statutory protection for
lenders to museum exhibitions in order to foster premier exhibitions. Part II discusses the background of the Schiele Case and the
trial court and appellate division decisions. This Part criticizes the
appellate decision, and argues that the trial court correctly found
that the New York statute protects against seizures for grand jury
subpoenas pursuant to criminal investigations, by considering the
harmful effects seizures may have on the ability of museums to
host major international exhibitions. Part II also considers the
chilling effect that may occur when collectors abstain from lending
in fear of possible seizure, and the potential impact on victims of
art theft who benefit from unimpeded exhibitions in locating their
stolen works. Part III sets forth current efforts and proposals that
the art and museum communities are developing to insure that
museum collections and exhibitions contain only those works
whose rightful ownership is certain. Part III also explores recently
improved means available to claimants to identify and recover
stolen art, and evolving remedies to resolve disputed claims of
ownership that avoid litigation.

all the protection necessary against any seizure. See infra text accompanying
notes 90-95 (discussing further MOMA's practice of seeking statutory protection
from seizure for exhibits).
" In New York City, more people visit museums than all other art
venues-opera, concerts, ballet, theater-combined. See Norman MacAfee, The
Scent of Art, PA. GAZETrE, Sep./Oct. 1998, at 42. Museum attendance even
exceeds that for the entire city's professional sporting events. Id.

ART SEIZURES

I.

THE STATUTES

In order to secure major international museum exhibitions,
statutory protection from seizure of art loans by third-party
claimants is essential.3" Aside from theft or damage to an artwork
on loan, "the emergence of an unsuspected ulterior owner during
the loan period is probably the situation most feared by borrowers." 39 A borrowing museum's inability to extend to lenders firm
guarantees against judicial seizure of artwork while on exhibition
will likely deter future loans. 40 In an era of international instability over museums' and private collectors' rightful ownership of
artwork stemming from the exposure of displaced artwork as a
result of World War II, 4" the need for statutory protection is
particularly urgent.42
Federal 43 and New York statutes" provide protection for
lenders from seizure of artwork loaned to non-profit museum
exhibitions, as well as to borrowers of such works by ensuring their

" For example, George Ortiz, a leading private collector and frequent lender
of antiquities, believes that some "firm guarantee against judicial seizure is an
'essential' factor" in a collector's decision to lend. See NORMAN PALMER, ART
LoANs 103 (1997).
39 Id.
4 ld.

41See infra note 178 (discussing that in the past year, claims to artwork

looted by the Nazis, and now in the possession of museums and collectors, have
emerged in Chicago and Seattle). See also Jonathan Mandell, Art, Artists and the
Nazis: The Modem Fallout,NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 3, 1998, at D16 (discussing
how the problem is more widespread in Europe where, for example, the French,
Dutch and Austrian government-run museums have admitted to holding many
"unclaimed" works of art stemming from Nazi thefts that could not be returned
to the proper owners following the end of World War II).
42 See infra Part I, discussing the equally important need for international
awareness and informational systems to identify art objects looted by the Nazis,
and the ability of these systems to enable the victims of theft to recover their
works.
41Immunity From Seizure Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (1994).
44N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999).
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ability to receive loans. Both the New York State Legislature45
("Legislature") and Congress 46 enacted the laws with the intention
of ensuring the protection of exhibited artwork, which lenders
otherwise would not entrust to museum exhibitions. This Part
analyzes and contrasts the two statutes, finding the New York law
to provide fuller and more efficient protection to New York
museums, and concludes by exploring efforts outside of the United
States to statutorily prohibit the seizure of art loans.
The Immunity From Seizure Act

A.

The Immunity from Seizure Act47 ("Federal Act"), enacted in
1965, grants protection from seizure to works from any foreign
country on loan to a not-for-profit cultural institution in the United
States for temporary exhibition. The statute provides in relevant
part:
Whenever any work of art... is imported into the United
States from any foreign country, . . no court of the
United States ... may issue or enforce any judicial

process, or enter any judgment, decree, or order, for the
purpose or having the effect of depriving such institution
...

of custody or control of such object if before the

importation of such object the President or his designee
has determined that the object is of cultural significance
and that the temporary exhibition ...

is in the national

interest, and a notice to that effect has been published in
the Federal Register.48

See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
intent of the New York anti-seizure statute).
46 See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Congressional intent of the Immunity from Seizure Act).
45

47

22 U.S.C. § 2459.

48

id.
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In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued an executive order4 9
appointing the Director of the United States Information Agency
("USIA") to assume the responsibilities designated to the President
under the Federal Act.50 The Presidential directive also compelled
the Director of the USIA to consult the Secretary of State with
respect to the determination of "national interest."5' The directive
further suggested that the USIA director consult with the Secretary
of the Smithsonian Institution and the Director of the National
Gallery as to the determination of the cultural significance of the
objects to be loaned.52
Congress enacted the Immunity from Seizure Act with the
intent of insuring the successful exhibition of art.53 The House
Judiciary Committee's Report 4 recognized that the Federal Act
would allow institutions to import for display works of art from
foreign countries "without the risk of the seizure or attachment of
the said objects by judicial process."55 The report went on to cite
the opinion of the Department of Justice that "[t]he commendable
objective of this legislation is to encourage the exhibition in the
United States of objects of cultural significance which, in the
absence of assurances such as are contained in the legislation,
would not be made available. 56 Thus, under the Federal Act,
museums could provide protection from seizure to their lenders to
secure successful exhibits, but only if they received government
approval, and only for works loaned from outside the United
States.

4'Exec. Order No. 12,047, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,359 (1978), amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,388, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,245 (1982). The 1978 Order replaced an
initial order of 1966, Exec. Order No. 11,312, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,415 (1966), which
originally delegated the functions to the Secretary of State. Id.
50 Exec. Order No. 12,047, 43 Fed. Reg. at 13,359.
51 Id.
52

id.

13 See

54 id.
55 id.
56

id.

H.R. REP. No. 89-1070 (1965).
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B. The New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
In 1968, three years following the implementation of the
Federal Act, New York State enacted its own anti-seizure statute.
Section 12.03 of the New York ACAL reads:
No process of attachment, execution, sequestration,
replevin, distress or any kind of seizure shall be served or
levied upon any work of fine art while the same is enroute
to or from, or while on exhibition or deposited by a
nonresident exhibitor at any exhibition held under the
auspices or supervision of any museum, college, university
or other nonprofit art gallery, institution or organization
within any city or county of this state for any cultural,
educational, charitable or other purpose not conducted for
profit to the exhibitor, nor shall such work of fine art be
subject to attachment, seizure, levy or sale, for any cause
whatever in the hands of the authorities of such exhibition
or otherwise.57
Although the catalyst of the law was a civil action in which the
works of a non-resident exhibitor were seized during an exhibition
in New York,58 an analysis of the bill's legislative history indicates that the Legislature and the author of the bill, New York
Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz,59 intended that it provide the
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999).
" In 1968, Governor Nelson Rockefeller signed the ACAL into law in
response to the seizure of a non-resident artist's work loaned to an exhibition
hosted by a Buffalo, New York museum. See Governor Nelson Rockefeller,
MEMORANDUM OF APPROVAL, Assembly Bill No. 6906, June 22, 1968,
Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065 at 29. In March, 1968, under an
order of attachment in a law suit, a New York gallery seized the works of the
internationally famous artist Naum Gabo which were part of a retrospective at
the Albright-Knox Museum in Buffalo. See Louis J. Lefkowitz, MEMORANDUM
17

FOR THE GOVERNOR, May 20, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws

1065 at 2.
51 See Governor Nelson Rockefeller, MEMORANDUM OF APPROVAL,
Assembly Bill No. 6906, June 22, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y.
Laws 1065 at 29 (stating that the bill was prepared by and was part of the
Attorney General's 1968 legislative program).
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broadest possible protection to artwork covered by the ACAL.6 °
The appellate division rejected the trial court's analysis of the
legislative history of the ACAL in the Schiele Case, which
presented several strong arguments indicating that the Legislature
intended to cover any and all seizures. 61 However, the legislative
policy at the root of the ACAL confirms that the statute was
designed to insure that New York museums have the capacity to
conduct the finest possible exhibits without concern over seizures.
Therefore, the spirit of the ACAL is served best by interpreting the
statute to apply to all seizures, both in the context of civil claims
and criminal investigations.
Although the statute does not expressly immunize loaned works
from seizures pursuant to criminal investigations, the Legislature
apparently was aware of the statute's potential effect on stolen
artwork before the bill was passed.62 Moreover, the Legislature
did not alter the bill's language to address this concern.6 3 A
memorandum from the Committee on State Legislation of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("Bar Committee")
expressed skepticism that the bill would prevent a rightful owner
from reclaiming stolen art.6 The memorandum stated that, "[i]f
[a] plaintiff, including a resident of this State, alleges that a work
on exhibit has been stolen from him or unlawfully retained by a

6 See Louis J. Lefkowitz, MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNOR, May 20,
1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065 at 2; Louis J. Lefkowitz,
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNOR, June 14, 1968, Governor's
Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065 at 8.
61People v. Museum of Modem Art (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces

Tecum), No. 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *4 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
62 See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing that the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York informed the Legislature of the
statute's effect on stolen art work).
63 The language of the bill, quoted in a memorandum of opposition to the
bill, is identical to the language as it exists in the enacted statute. Compare
Memorandum No. 122, Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Committee on State Legislation, June 18, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968
N.Y. Laws 1065 at 18, with N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney

1999).
64Memorandum No. 122, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065
at 18.
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bailee, he may nonetheless not replevy the property if the criteria
of the bill are met., 65 Attorney General Lefkowitz acknowledged
the Bar Committee's criticism of the bill and responded, refusing
to alter the bill's language.66 The trial court interpreted this
response as a clear indication that the statute was to "provide
coverage for all seizures, whether in the context of a civil action or
a criminal investigation., 67 The appellate division, in reversing the
trial court, held that the Bar Committee's memorandum, although
discussing stolen property, only referenced the civil remedy of
replevin. 68 The appellate court also noted that all agencies and
legal groups whom the drafters of the bill heard from had civil
interests and that no law enforcement or criminal defense groups
objected to the bill.69
While the trial and appellate courts differ over whether the Bar
Committee's memorandum evidences a cognizance on the part of
the Legislature and the Attorney General that the statute was to
cover seizures pursuant to criminal investigations, what appears
obvious is that the Attorney General intended the bill to afford
complete protection from seizure with no exceptions. In his
response to the Bar Committee, Attorney General Lefkowitz
initially noted the Bar Committee's failure to grasp the "importance
of this bill to museums and other cultural institutions in enabling
them to borrow works of art for temporary exhibitions held within
the State."7 The Attorney General stressed the importance that
the exemption from seizure should not contain any exceptions or
loopholes because lenders might keep their artwork in the safety of

65 Id.
66

Louis J. Lefkowitz,

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNOR,

June 14, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065 at 8.
67 In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Served on
the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd, mot.
denied sub nom. People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999 WL
145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
68 People v. Museum of Modem Art, 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *4
(N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
69 Id.

70 Louis J. Lefkowitz, SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNOR,

June 14, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065 at 8.
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their homes if the bill made lenders feel only "half-safe."'" The
Attorney General then concluded his memorandum by reiterating
the need for an "omnibus" exemption from seizures in order not to
"frighten[] -off' the potentially large number of non-resident lenders
to New York museum exhibitions.72 As the trial court observed,
"[t]he Attorney General, the highest law enforcement officer of the
state, is presumed to have recognized the potential consequences of
the statute in criminal investigations. 73 Yet instead of expressing
his concern that the statute could inhibit criminal investigations into
allegedly stolen works, he advocated an omnibus exemption. Thus,
although the trial court's belief may be overstated in finding that
"the direct references by the Bar Association and the Attorney
General to the effect of the statute on stolen art ... removes any
doubt that the enactment was intended to provide coverage for all
seizures, whether in the context of a civil action or a criminal
investigation,"74 the memoranda appear at least to demonstrate a
legislative intent to provide the broadest protection from seizure for
loans to New York museum exhibitions.
The conclusion that the Legislature intended the ACAL to apply
to any and all seizures is further, and most clearly, evidenced by
a review of the Attorney General's and the Governor's memoranda
in support of the law, which suggest that the statute's raison d'etre
is to ensure that New York museums continue to lead the art world
in the presentation of major exhibitions. Thus, even if the Legislature did not enact the ACAL with the specific purpose of
7

Id. at 9. The Attorney General added:

To puncture the exemption sought by this bill with a single major
loophole.., thus forcing 'potential-lenders-in-good-faith' to seek legal
advice before lending their works to museums of this State would be
self-defeating, since non-resident artists and patrons of the arts can
exercise their free alternative to stay out of trouble by keeping their
possessions safely at home.

Id.
72

Id. at 10.

" In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on
the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd, mot.
denied sub nom. People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999 WL
145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
71

Id. (emphasis added).

708

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

prohibiting seizures pursuant to criminal investigations, the desired
immunizing effect was to apply to all seizures, as the Legislature
would have seen any seizure as equally detrimental to the health of
New York museum exhibitions.
An analysis of Governor's Bill Jacket elucidates that the ACAL
emanates from a legislative policy that attempts to ensure museums
the opportunity to display the finest possible exhibits. In his
Memorandum of Approval, the Governor stated that the disruption
of the exhibit inspiring the ACAL "has deeply concerned the
artistic world, which feels that the repercussions could result in the
reluctance of out-of-state exhibitors to show their work in New
York ....
The bill ... will go far to allay the fears of potential
exhibitors and enable the State of New York to maintain its preeminent position in the arts. 75 As the Attorney General explained,
the "primary policy concern of this bill is not with the lenders, but
with the museums and other cultural institutions of this state which
are completely and thoroughly dependent upon the free flow of
works of art into the State for the purpose of conducting exhibitions of major public interest., 76 It is unlikely that the Legislature,
when enacting the statute in 1968, foresaw the rise of recent claims
challenging the provenance of art looted by the Nazis over fifty
years ago and now in the hands of good faith purchasers.7 7
Although it may appear unsympathetic to claimants in this
context,78 the text of the statute combined with the legislative
policy of the ACAL to provide complete protection to exhibitions,

7' Governor Nelson Rockefeller, MEMORANDUM OF

APPROVAL,

Assembly

Bill No. 6906, June 22, 1968, Governor'sBill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065
at 29.
76

Louis J. Lefkowitz,

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNOR,

June 14, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968 N.Y. Laws 1065 at 10.
7 Claims for restitution of artwork stolen by the Nazis has reached great
proportions only relatively recently. See Detlev F. Vagts, Restitution for
Historical Wrongs, The American Courts and International Law, 92 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 232, 232 (1998).
78 The trial court, while finding that the ACAL covered any seizure,
emphasized that the horror of the Holocaust was beyond words, but that the
tragedy of the Holocaust, "although casting a pall over this matter," must be
separated when interpreting the statute. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
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indicates that the Legislature intended the statute to prevent any
kind of interference with the museum community's ability to
provide world-class exhibitions.
C. The Two Statutes Contrasted
There are several significant differences between the ACAL and
the Federal Act, which suggest that obtaining protection under the
ACAL is simpler and more expedient for New York museums. For
example, the ACAL does not require a designation of "cultural
significance" or "national interest."7 9 In fact, the ACAL does not
require any filing or application with the State to obtain exemption
from seizure. Protection under the ACAL is automatic. 8° By
contrast, the Federal Act demands publication of notice in the
Federal Register, which requires a minimum of three days after
submission by the USIA. 81 Consultation with the State Department averages ten days.82 These time periods do not seem terribly
lengthy but the submissions a museum must make to the USIA
could be quite time-consuming.
Pursuant to the Federal Act, the USIA requires a museum
seeking immunity from seizure to provide a substantial amount of
information on all aspects of the proposed exhibition. 83 A museum
is required to disclose a description of each work to be covered, a
copy of the agreement with each lender and participating museums,
and a statement as to the non-profit nature of the exhibition. 84
Most notably, a museum must supply a statement as to why anyone
might want to attach an exhibited work in the United States and an
79 N.Y. ARTs & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999).
80 Id.

"' See R. Wallace Stuart, Legal Problems of Museum Administration, SB53

ALI-ABA 323, 327 (1997) (providing a breakdown of the components of the
Federal Act and a checklist outlining the requirements that museums must meet
in order to obtain protection under the Federal Act).
82

Id.

83 Id.

at 328-29.

4 The USIA requires museums to submit other information such as the dates
the works will arrive in the United States, a statement demonstrating the cultural
significance of the works to be exhibited, and information proving the exhibitor's
status as an educational or cultural institution. Id.
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evaluation of the threat.85 Furthermore, the USIA may require
time to consult other authorities to determine the issue of the
exhibit's cultural significance.86
The most significant difference between the statutes is that the
Federal Act only applies to works loaned from abroad, whereas the
ACAL also protects works loaned from within the United States.87
This is a critical distinction in the extent of protection because
lenders within the United States loan the vast majority of artwork
to American museums for exhibitions.88
Considering the steps the Federal Act requires museums to
undertake to obtain immunity from seizure and the narrower scope
of protection it offers, New York museums understandably find the
automatic protection of the ACAL more attractive. 89 According to
the Director of MOMA, "New York cultural institutions often
eliminate th[e] time-consuming process" required in seeking

85

See id. MOMA could not have successfully undertaken this requirement

and anticipated the claims of the Schiele claimants if the museum had applied
for federal protection for the Schiele exhibition since, according to MOMA's
director, MOMA "had no reason to believe that there was any cloud on the
paintings' past. Both of the pictures had been exhibited around the world for
decades and both had been reproduced frequently in books." See House
Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 178 (statement of Glenn D. Lowry,
Director, Museum of Modem Art, New York). "Whatever logistical and financial
difficulties exist for examining one's own collection are multiplied for loans.
There is no effective way to determine the provenance of, in this case, 152 works
of art arriving for a three month loan." See House Holocaust Hearings, supra
note 4, at 179 (statement of Glenn D. Lowry).
86 If the USIA determines that outside advice is required, it may consult the
Smithsonian Institute, the National Gallery or any other government agency. See
Stuart, supra note 81, at 327. The USIA has also consulted experts from the
private sector. See Stuart, supra note 81, at 327.
87 The Federal Act protects works "imported into the United States from any
foreign country," 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (1994), whereas the ACAL immunizes from
seizure works loaned by any "nonresident exhibitor," N.Y. ARTS & CuLT. AFF.
LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999).
88 In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on
the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd, mot.
denied sub nom. People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999 WL
145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
89 Id. at 876.

ART SEIZURES

protection under the Federal Act.90 The museums prefer instead
to rely on the apparent automatic protection from any seizure
granted by the ACAL. 9' In fact, MOMA has sought federal
protection for only four of eighty-nine exhibitions it has hosted
over the last three years,92 each at the request of its lenders.93
MOMA received federal protection on all four occasions.9 4 For

the Schiele exhibition, however, MOMA did not seek federal
protection, choosing instead to rely on the New York statute.95
D. Statutory Protection in Foreign Jurisdictions
New York is not the only forum to legislate in an effort to
secure major international exhibitions. In 1994, France enacted
legislation protecting from seizure all cultural objects loaned by a
"foreign power, local authority or cultural institution to the French
State, for public exhibition in France." 96 France instituted the law
in response to a French national who attempted to sequester
paintings loaned by Russian national museums to an Henri Matisse
exhibition at the Centre Georges Pompidou ("Pompidou Center")
in Paris, in order to determine a claim of ownership.97 The
90 Id.
91 Id.
92

Id.

93Id.
94

id.

95 id.

96 Ruth Redmond-Cooper, Disputed Title to Loaned Works of Art: The

Shchukin Litigation, 1 ART

ANTIQUrrY

& L. 73, 76 (1996) (citing Article 61,

Law No. 94-679 of Aug. 8, 1994). The French law does not grant blanket

protection, but limits coverage through governmental order to works that are
publicly owned and loaned to French public entities. Id.

" Id. at 73-74. The exhibition borrowed 21 works from the Pushkin and
Hermitage museums. Id. at 73. Many of these works had been confiscated during
the Russian revolution of 1917 from huge private collections of 20th century
French art. Id. The claimant of the Matisses, a French citizen, was the daughter
of Sergei Ivanovich Shchukin, a Matisse patron and one of the collectors. Id. at
73-74. The law also may have been the result of non-French lenders withholding
two works from the Claude Monet "Cathedrals" show at the Musbe des BeauxArts, in Rouen, France in 1994 in the wake of the claim on the Matisses. See
PALMER, supra note 38, at 103.
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Pompidou Center challenged the action as a matter of "grave
concern," claiming that successful prosecution would "severely
disrupt inter-state cultural exchanges. 98 The French court ruled
against the claimant on the basis of the sovereign immunity 9 of
the Russian Federation and never reached the policy concerns
affecting loans to museums."
However, the policy concerns did not go unnoticed. The French
government enacted the anti-seizure law soon after the court's
decision.'0 ' Dissatisfied that the French court never reached the
policy concerns affecting museum loans, one commentator
suggested that these concerns must be considered because "if doubt
subsists on this issue, major international exhibitions will be
impossible, since owners will refrain from lending if they consider
that their works may be placed in jeopardy by ownership claims of
98 See Redmond-Cooper, supra note 96, at 74.
99 See Redmond-Cooper, supra note 96, at 74. The United States also applies
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp. 1996). Under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, "a foreign sovereign is immune from the jurisdiction of 'the courts of
the United States and of the States."' Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26
F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The doctrine is subject to certain statutory
exceptions, such as circumstances in which the foreign sovereign has explicitly
or implicitly waved its immunity, or in which the claim arises from a foreign
state's commercial activity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (noting general exceptions
to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state). "A 'commercial activity' means
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). "The commercial character of an
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. Like
the American law, French and English courts limit their doctrines of sovereign
immunity so as not to include commercial activity. See Redmond-Cooper, supra
note 96, at 75. See also Redmond-Cooper, supra note 96, at 75-78 (analyzing
whether loaning of art constitutes commercial activity for purposes of sovereign
immunity in the French or English courts).
'oo See Redmond-Cooper, supra note 96, at 74 (discussing Stchoukine v. Le
Centre National d'Art et de Culture Georges Pompidou, T.G.I. Paris, le ch., Ire
section, June 16, 1993). The Stchoukine court ruled that the title of the claimant's
deceased father had been revoked by a Russian "Act of nationalisation" in 1918
under which property of Russian citizens was taken by the Russian government
in accordance with Russian law. See PALMER, supra note 38, at 102.
101 Redmond-Cooper, supra note 96, at 76.
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third parties."1 °2 Several recent exhibitions in
France have em10 3
ployed the law for protection against seizure.
Four Canadian provinces also have enacted anti-seizure
statutes." °4 British Columbia's statute appears to provide broad
protection to exhibitors. The law states that "[n]o proceeding for
possession or for a property interest shall be brought in respect of
works of art or objects of cultural or historical significance brought
into the Province for temporary public exhibit."'0 5 The British
Columbian law seems to exceed the scope of the ACAL and the
Federal Act since it protects not only seizure, but any proceeding
for restitution of artwork temporarily exhibited. Manitoba protects
artwork or other cultural objects from seizure loaned for temporary
display from foreign countries to governmental, cultural or
educational institutions, if the Manitoban government determines
the work to be of "cultural significance," and the exhibition to be
"in the interest of the people of Manitoba."' 1 6 Ontario provides
the same protection from seizure as Manitoba, but limited to nonprofit exhibitions.'0 7 The province of Quebec provides exhibitors
with statutory protection from seizure as well.0 8
II. THE EGON SCHIELE CASE
From October 8, 1997 to January 4, 1998, MOMA held an
exhibition entitled "Egon Schiele: The Leopold Collection,

Redmond-Cooper, supra note 96, at 74.
These shows include Maurice Denis, Lyon, September, 1994; Andre
Derain, Paris, September, 1994; and Paul C~zanne, Paris, July, 1995. See
Redmond-Cooper, supra note 96, at 76. See also PALMER, supra note 38, at 112.
'0oSee PALMER, supra note 38, at 111.
105 The British Columbia Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C., § 50(1) (1980)
(Can.).
106 The Foreign Cultural Objects Immunity From Seizure Act, R.S.M., ch.
F.140 (1976) (Can.).
107 Foreign Cultural Objects Immunity from Seizure Act, R.S.O., ch. 172
102
103

(1980) (Can.).
108 See PALMER, supra note 38, at 111 (citing Art 553.1, Code of Civil
Procedure, S.Q., ch. 48 (1976) (Can.)).
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Vienna."' 9 The exhibition was on loan from the Leopold Museum of Austria and had been exhibited in several cities around the
world before arriving in New York.1 Five days before the
exhibit was to close and return to Europe, MOMA received letters
from two separate claimants asserting that an exhibited painting
was taken from the possession of their respective ancestors during
the Nazi annexation of Austria during World War I."1 The
letters requested that MOMA not move the paintings out of its
jurisdiction until the matter of true ownership could be determined.11 2 On January 3, 1998, MOMA notified the claimants that
'09 In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served
on the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd,
mot. denied sub nom. People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999
WL 145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999). The exhibit contained over
150 works and was loaned by the Leopold Museum in Vienna, Austria. Id. The
Museum takes its name from Dr. Rudolph Leopold, an Austrian ophthalmologist
and passionate collector of Egon Schiele, who recently sold his collection of
more than 250 Schieles to Austria for construction of a new state museum. See
Dobrzynski, A SingularPassion, supra note 13, at El. Doctor Leopold has been
fascinated by Schiele his entire life and has collected Schieles since he was in
medical school. However, newspaper reports which appeared at the close of the
Schiele exhibit in New York, just before MOMA received notice of the claims,
raised questions about Dr. Leopold's knowledge that Ms. Bondi was the rightful
owner of "Portrait of Wally" before Leopold himself purchased the painting. The
reports also discussed other shady practices Dr. Leopold has been accused of
employing to acquire his Schiele collection. According to the reports, Dr.
Leopold denies using any illegitimate methods of acquisition. See Dobrzynski,
A Singular Passion,supra note 13, at El.
"1 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 874. The
exhibit visited England, Germany, Switzerland and Japan before reaching New
York. Id.
..Id. at 874-75. In late December, 1997, Henry Bondi, the nephew of Lea
Bondi, the original owner of "Portrait of Wally," one of the challenged paintings,
sent a letter to Glenn D. Lowry, the Director of MOMA, on behalf of Ms.
Bondi's other heirs who reside in New York City, the State of Washington and
Great Britain. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Modem is Urged to Play Solomon in
PaintingsDispute, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at El. Rita and Kathleen Reif, the
heirs of Fritz Grunbaum, the original owner of the other painting, "Dead City
III," also sent MOMA a letter claiming rightful ownership. See In re GrandJury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
112 Mr. Bondi wrote, "[w]e earnestly request that you do not return the
painting to the jurisdiction of the 'lenders' until the matter of true ownership has
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it was in no position to pass judgment on the foundation of their
claims." 3 MOMA averred that it had "no knowledge of the
existence of any claims with respect to the Paintings."'" 4 Furthermore, the paintings previously had been exhibited and published
around the world." 5 On January 7, 1998, pursuant to a criminal
investigation into the allegedly stolen property, the District
Attorney served MOMA with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum,
ordering MOMA to hold the paintings pending an investigation into
6
rightful ownership."
On January 22, 1998, MOMA filed a motion to quash the
subpoena." 7 MOMA argued that the District Attorney's actions
violated the law because the "statute is unambiguous, and provides
no exceptions." ' 1 8 MOMA further argued that the subpoena was
contrary to the underlying public policy safeguarding loaned works
and ensuring that New York "maintain its pre-eminent position in
the arts."" 9 The District Attorney responded that despite the
phrase "any seizure," the specific actions the statute referred to
were all civil remedies. 120 The District Attorney asserted that the
rules of statutory construction therefore limited "any" to mean any

been clarified." See Dobrzynski, supra note 111, at El. The Reifs declared that
the heirs of Mr. Grunbaum never consented to any sale or transfer of the
painting. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 875. The
heirs of Mr. Grunbaum further stated that they are the lawful owners of the
painting and "requested that the Museum not return the Painting[] to the lender
until the matter of true ownership was resolved." Id.
113

id.

114

id.

115Id.

In fact, the painting claimed by the Reif s, "Dead City III," at one
time had been exhibited at the Guggenheim Museum in New York. Id.
116 Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing that the District
Attorney actually subpoenaed MOMA to turn over the works but later reached
a deal with MOMA that it hold the paintings and not return them to Europe with
the remainder of the exhibit until the court decided the issue).
117 Brief for Petitioner at 1, In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup.
Ct. 1998) (No. 28012-98).
118id.
119 Id. at 14.
120 In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 876. See also
supra note 57 and accompanying text (providing text of the ACAL).
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other civil remedies.'21 Furthermore, nothing within the text of
the statute, argued the District Attorney, indicated that the Legislature intended to restrict the Grand Jury's power to subpoena art
work, 122 and that the legislative history revealed that the statute
was only to apply to civil remedies. 123 The trial court, in an
opinion authored by Justice Laura Drager, agreed with MOMA and
quashed the subpoena, holding that "[t]he clear import of the term
'any kind of seizure' leaves no doubt that the Legislature intended
to prohibit any court process that would interfere with art work on
loan from out of state." 124 Justice Drager then held that a grand
jury subpoena was a clear example of such a court process.125 As
a result, Justice Drager ruled that the statute prohibited seizures in
criminal as well as civil actions. 26 The trial court opinion further
rejected the argument that the federal statute, which only prohibits
seizures of works loaned to exhibitions from abroad, preempted the
New York statute. 27 However, at the heart of the trial court's
opinion was the recognition of the need for statutory protection

121In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
122 Id. at 876. See also Brief for Appellant at 12, People v. Museum

of

Modem Art, 1999 WL 145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999) (No.
28012-98) (supporting the District Attorney's argument).
123In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 876. See also
Brief for Appellant at 13, Museum of Modern Art (No. 28012-98) (supporting the
District Attorney's argument).
124In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
125 Id. at 877.
126Id. at 881. The court also discussed the limits that a grand jury subpoena
faces in other areas of the law and that "[o]n occasion, the Legislature has
determined that in balancing competing interests, the need for unfettered Grand
Jury investigations must yield to other policy considerations. Where the
Legislature limits those powers 'it may do so explicitly or by implication."' Id.
at 880 (citation omitted).
127 Id. at 884. The second half of the opinion is devoted to the District
Attorney's argument that the New York statute is preempted by the Federal Act.
Id. at 881. Federal law preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution in three circumstances. Id. at 882. The trial court found that none
of the three circumstances were satisfied. Id. First, the language of the IFSA does
not expressly prohibit the ACAL; second, Congress did not intend to occupy
exclusively the field of regulated conduct; and finally, the ACAL does not
conflict with the goals of the Federal Act. Id.
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under the ACAL to insure
that New York continue its preeminence
28
as a cultural center.1
The appellate division's decision, in reversing the trial court,
was devoid of any such policy considerations. 19 In a narrow
statutory analysis, the appellate panel held that a subpoena does not
constitute a seizure 13° and that the Legislature simply intended to
"protect non-resident exhibitors from 'legal seizures by local
creditors."",131 In finding that the ACAL does not immunize loans
from seizure in the context of a criminal investigation, the appellate
division found it "unnecessary to reach the issue of whether such
13 2
statute is preempted by Federal law."'
The appellate division also based its ruling on the civil lawrelated location within New York statutory law of the statute from
which the text of the ACAL was drawn. 33 The appellate division
noted that the ACAL emanates from a statute enacted in 1880,
which prevents seizure of articles displayed at international
exhibitions held in New York State. 13' This statute originated in
the Code of Civil Procedure before being moved to the Personal
Property Law in 1920, where it presently stands. 13' The appellate
division then noted that the Penal Law and the Criminal Procedure
Law ("CPL") "are in pari materia in that they both relate to the
128 "With

its vast array of cultural institutions, New York has a unique

interest in maximizing the possibility of exhibiting art on loan from other states
and around the world." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d

at 884. See also id. at 881 ("The statute has served the state well in enhancing
its position as a cultural center.").
129 The closest the appellate panel came to considering the broad policy
intent of the ACAL was a dismissive statement that "no one disputes" the
Legislature's intention "to promote the arts in New York and to maintain a 'free
flow' of art by ensuring that New York museums and other cultural institutions
could conduct exhibitions of major public interest without concern about legal
processes and challenges." People v. Museum of Modem Art (In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum), No. 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *3 (N.Y. App.

Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
130 Id. at *2.
13 Id. at *3.

132 Id. at *5.
133 Id. at *3.
134 Id. (citing L. 1880, ch. 393, § 1).
135 Id. (citing N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 250 (McKinney 1992)).
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criminal branch of the law, but the [Civil Practice Law and Rules]
and its predecessors are not generally so related to either the Penal
Law or the CPL."' 36 Thus, the court concluded that the ACAL,

being almost identical to a statute located in the Code of Civil
Procedure and the Personal Property Law, "with no reference
whatsoever to the criminal statutes, cannot, without more, be
considered to have been intended to effect the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Law, which applies exclusively to all criminal
actions and proceedings, including criminal investigations. ' 37
The appellate division, however, avoided several points raised
by the trial court demonstrating that the location of the ACAL
indicates that immunity from seizure may not have been intended
to pertain only to civil remedies. First, a recommendation in the
Bar Committee's memorandum opposing the bill1 38 suggested that
the Legislature should incorporate the statute within the Civil
Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") where civil remedies, such as
attachment, are generally located, rather than incorporate it in the
General Business Law ("GBL"). 139 The Legislature specifically
rejected this proposal. 4 ° Second, the statute has resided since its
inception in sets of laws that contain criminal penalties. The trial
court described the GBL as "a substantive series of enactments
replete with criminal penalties often prosecuted by the Attorney
General's office." 4 ' In 1983, the statute was transferred to the

136

id.

137

id.

138 Memorandum

No. 122, Association of the Bar of the City of New York,

Committee on State Legislation, June 18, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket to 1968
N.Y. Laws 1065 at 18.
139 "It would be desirable to cover this subject not, as does the bill, in the
General Business Law, but rather in the CPLR .... " Id.
140 In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served
on the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd,
mot. denied sub nom. People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999
WL 145904, at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
'14Id. The District Attorney conceded that "many business-related offenses"
are contained in the GBL, such as illegal auctioneering practices (section 27),
illegal peddling (section 34), and illegal junk dealing (section 64) although "the
provisions of the chapter are in the main unrelated to criminal law, and certainly
the contents of this chapter are unrelated to criminal practice." Brief for

ART SEIZURES

719

New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, where it currently
143
exists."' This body of law also contains criminal penalties.
Thus, since its inception, the ACAL has been located among
statutes containing both civil and criminal provisions. Finally, as
the appellate division noted, the CPLR "does apply to motions to
quash subpoenas issued in furtherance of a criminal investigation." 144 It seems sensible, therefore, to construe the ACAL in
both a civil and criminal context.
The trial court also recognized that the District Attorney's
grand jury investigation would not be defeated by an inability to
subpoena the paintings.' 45 The trial court endorsed MOMA's
offer to have the paintings photographed to preserve the evidence
for the grand jury, thus enabling the District Attorney to proceed
with the investigation. 46 Furthermore, the trial court stated that
the claimants in the Schiele Case are not precluded from pursuing
their claims against the lender if the District Attorney is barred
from issuing a subpoena to MOMA to seize the works in question. 47 As the trial court noted, a claimant will always know the

Appellant at 22,
(N.Y. App. Div.
142 See N.Y.
143 See, e.g.,

People v. Museum of Modem Art, 1999 WL 145904, at *3
Mar. 16, 1999) (No. 28012-98). ARTs & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999).
id. §§ 13.03, 19.15, 23.05, 23.19.

'44People v. Museum of Modem Art (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum), No. 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999)
(citing In re Cunningham v. Nadjari, 347 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1976)).
145 In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
146The court stated that photographs could be taken immediately and would
not interfere meaningfully with the possession of the works, and thus would not
constitute a seizure. Id. The District Attorney insisted that photographs would not
be a reasonable alternative to seizure because they are not appropriate evidentiary
substitutes and they would fail to provide proof of value, necessary to comply
with the stolen property statutes. Brief for Appellant at 39, People v. Museum
of Modem Art, 1999 WL 145904, at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999) (No.
28012-98). More importantly, the District Attorney argued, the paintings must
remain in New York during the investigation because "[ilt would be absurd for
anyone to be permitted to ship possibly stolen property outside New York State."
Id.
"' In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
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held,
location of artwork covered by the statute, even if privately
1 48
museum.
a
in
public
the
to
displayed
be
will
it
since
The trial court raised an additional point that even if the
claimants were the rightful owners of the paintings, it is questionable whether a criminal investigation could lead to a return of the
works without a civil suit to determine ownership.14 9 A grand
jury subpoena is a temporary seizure for a reasonable period of
time. 5 ° It is not intended to secure property permanently. Thus,
the trial court stated, the intent of the statute governing grand jury
subpoenas is to return the subpoenaed property to the entity that
was served with the subpoena. 15' The District Attorney argued
that under New York Penal Law section 450.10, if the paintings
were stolen, it would be inappropriate to return the paintings to
MOMA until the issue of rightful ownership is determined.' 52
Penal Law section 450.10 provides for property to be returned to
the rightful owner during the pendency of a criminal proceeding
"after satisfactory proof of such person's entitlement to the
possession thereof."' 3 However, this section does not specify a
procedure to determine title. 54 Accordingly, even if the ACAL
permits seizure by the District Attorney, an additional proceeding
would have to examine a claimant's assertion of entitlement to

148

In the Schiele Case, the claimants knew the identity of the current owner,

provenance, value, and location of the paintings. Id. Additionally, the current
owner had openly acknowledged that the claimants' ancestors at one time owned
the works. Id. The trial court failed to note, however, that this may not always
be the case. In a situation where a work is loaned by a private lender who does
not want an exhibitor to release his or her identity, a claimant will not know the
lender's name or location based on a visit to the exhibition.
149Id.

at 880 n.ll.

0 Id. "The possession shall be for a period of time, and on terms and
conditions, as may reasonably be required for the action or proceeding." N.Y.
CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 610.25(2) (McKinney 1995).
151 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 880 n.ll.
152 Id. See also Brief for Appellant at 39-40, Museum of Modern Art, (No.
28012-98).
's3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 450.10(2) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1999).
's See id.
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ownership of the disputed work, and to investigate the ownership
history of the work. 55
The appellate division held that it found no evidence in the
District Attorney's subpoena of notice to retain the paintings in
custody. 5 6 However, the court then stated that the District Attorney could retain subpoenaed property under a subpoena that noticed
an intent to retain. 57 The court held that such a retention of
property would not "run afoul" of the ACAL as a prohibited
seizure."' Thus, with the District Attorney now armed with the
ability to retain subpoenaed artwork in a future case, the trial
court's finding of the necessity of a civil proceeding to determine
ownership of the retained paintings remains.
A civil proceeding to determine competing claims to artwork
raises a host of complex legal issues that typically requires an
extensive period of time to resolve.15 9 To adjudicate ownership
of an artwork where transfers of ownership occurred overseas, a
court confronts choice of law issues as to which country's law
governs the ownership proceeding. 1" In a case determining the
...
In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 880 n.ll.
156

People v. Museum of Modern Art (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces

Tecum), No. 28012-98, 1999 WL 145904, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
157 Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 610.25(2) (McKinney 1995)
("Where physical evidence specified to be produced will be sought to be retained
in custody, notice of such fact shall be given the subpoenaed party.")).
158 Museum of Modern Art, 1999 WL 145904, at *2.
59
' See Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the
Museum: A Proposed Solution to Disputes Over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 15, 36 (1988) (stating that a claim involving artwork stolen during World
War II will take between seven and twelve years to resolve).
16 See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 286 (7th Cir. 1990) (determining that
Indiana law rather than Swiss law governed a suit for replevin of mosaics stolen
from a Cypriot Church). The United States, England and European civil law
nations, apply the lex situs rule to the transfer of chattels. See Steven F. Grover,
Note, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin
Actions: A ComparativeStudy, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1431, 1457-58 (1992). Under the
lex situs rule, "for an international sale involving a work of art, the transfer of
ownership is governed by the law of the state where the object is situated at the
time of the alleged transfer." See Quentin Byrne-Sutton, Who is the Rightful
Owner of a Stolen Work of Art? A Source of Conflict in InternationalTrade, in
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INTERNATIONAL SALES OF WORKS OF ART 500, 500 (Pierre Lalive ed., 1985).

The lex situs rule focuses the property dispute on the conduct or transaction that
led to the defendant's possession, usually a sale from an art dealer or other
intermediary to the good faith purchaser. See Robin Morris Collin, The Law and
Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 How. L.J. 17, 22-23 (1993). There are
several factors favoring the lex situs rule, including a respect among sovereigns
for the right of each to determine the rules under which property within one's
state can be held, transferred or bequeathed. See Pecoraro, supra note 8, at 9-10.
The rule also avoids commercial uncertainty by preventing the forum state in
which the dispute was filed from undoing transactions valid under the laws of
the country in which the transfer occurred. See Pecoraro, supra note 8, at 9-10.
The lex situs rule is subject to several exceptions including where the law of the
situs would be contrary to legal principles or policies of the forum state. See
Pecoraro, supra note 8, at 11.
Although the United States generally maintains "flexible choice-of-law rules
capable of responding to policy considerations [which] better [enable a court] to
render a just result, the lex situs rule has survived." Pecoraro, supra note 8, at
10. An example of the application in New York of the lex situs rule, applied in
combination with the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
("Restatement") is demonstrated in Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon.
536 F. Supp. 829, 845-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afftd, 678 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir.
1982). The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, "substantially for the reasons
stated in the district court's opinion." Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1160. The Elicofon
court determined a choice of law question as to whether New York or German
law should determine the interest of title between an original owner and a good
faith purchaser. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 845-46. An American citizen bought
two Albrecht Ddirer portraits in New York in good faith from an American
soldier who had stolen the paintings from Germany during World War II. Id. at
830. The purchaser contended that since the theft of the works occurred in
Germany, German law granted him good title. Id. at 845. See also infra note 163
(describing German law and the rights of the good faith purchaser). The court
rejected this argument, instead applying the law of lex situs, holding that "New
York's choice of law dictates that questions relating to the validity of a transfer
of personal property are governed by the law of the state where the property is
located at the time of the alleged transfer." Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 845-46.
However, the court then supplemented its acceptance of the lex situs rule under
the Restatement's "significant relationship" analysis, stating that the case's
contacts with New York, because the defendant purchased and held the paintings
in New York, are "relevant to effecting its interest in regulating the transfer of
title in personal property in a matter which best promotes its policy." Id. at 846
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 242, 246 (1971)). See
also Alejandro M. Garro, The Recovery of Stolen Art Objects from Bona Fide
Purchasers, in INTERNATIONAL SALES OF WORKS OF ART 503, 505 (Pierre
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right to title of a good faith purchaser of stolen artwork, the choice
of law is particularly important because it may determine the
outcome of the dispute. 61 European civil law differs from United
States common law on several substantive legal principles affecting

Lalive ed., 1985). Thus, while Elicofon adopted the lex situs rule, "the court's
rationale suggests that the overriding policy concern should be the long-term
health of the legitimate marketplace for art as well as a state's interest in
controlling the commercial norms and standards by which business is done in its
jurisdiction." See Collin, supra, at 24-25.
In light of Elicofon, it is unclear which nation's law a court would apply to
determine a claim of ownership of an artwork stolen by the Nazis, bought by a
good faith purchaser in Europe, and later loaned to a New York museum. This
is precisely the situation in the Schiele Case, and under Elicofon's lex situs
analysis, if the "alleged transfer" occurred in Europe, the law of the country
where transfer occurred (Austria, in the Schiele Case) would govern the validity
of the transfer. See Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 845-46. On the other hand, as
Elicofon also stated, a court may additionally apply the Restatement's significant
relationship analysis. Id. at 846. Since Elicofon held that New York law and
policy reflect a strong concern for favoring an original owner's right to title and
deterring development of a legal code that will facilitate art theft, a court could
override the lex situs rule using the Restatement's significant relationship
analysis. However, this tendency toward favoring the interests of an original
owner and regulating the New York art market may not lead a court to apply
New York law to cases concerning works, whose transfer of ownership occurred
outside of New York, which are temporarily loaned to museum exhibitions. This
is because the lender is not transferring an ownership interest in New York, but
merely temporarily lending the work. Thus, Elicofon's concern for New York
"becoming a marketplace for stolen goods" is similarly not at issue. Id. See also
Garro, supra, at 512-14 (further discussing the "unsettled state of New York
conflicts theory").
161In bringing suit to recover a stolen work of art,
the plaintiff must typically establish its possession of good title to the
[artwork], either through ownership or by demonstrating some other
right to [it]. The outcome of such suits, however, more often than not
turns on whether the courts of the forum state agree to recognize and
enforce that title (which is difficult to predict, given states' conflicting
definitions of what constitutes good title). Much, therefore, depends on
how jurisdiction over the civil action for recovery is determined and
eventual conflicts of jurisdiction are resolved.
Pecoraro, supra note 8, at 3.
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restitution cases. 162 European civil law generally favors the good
faith purchaser over the original owner. 163 In the United States,
162

See Vagts, supra note 77, at 234. The right to title of the good faith

purchaser is "one if the few examples of precisely contrary rules in Common
Law and Civil Law systems." John Henry Merryman, American Law and the
InternationalTrade in Art, in INTERNATIONAL SALES OF WORKS OF ART 425,
428 (Pierre Lalive ed., 1985). Ownership disputes over artwork looted by the
Nazis from Jewish families during World War II generally will involve
subsequent transfers of ownership that occurred in Europe. Patty Gerstenblith,
Cultural Propertyand World War II: Some Implicationsfor American Museums:
A Legal Background, SC40 ALI-ABA 17, 26 (1998).
163 Civil law nations, to varying degrees, favor the good faith purchaser of
stolen property over the original owner. See Grover, supra note 160, at 1448.
Such civil law nations include Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Mexico and
many other Central and South American nations. See Grover, supra note 160, at
1442. The degree to which each nation favors the good faith purchaser is based
upon the extent that the law of each nation reflects Roman or Germanic legal
principles as to the rights of an original owner. See RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER
ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 283-86 (5th ed. 1988). Roman law clearly gave the
original owner a right to recover stolen chattels. Id. Germanic customary laws,
on the other hand, were more favorable to the good faith purchaser. Id. From the
15th to the 19th century, the Roman and Germanic viewpoints vied for
predominance. Id. Eventually, the drafters of modem commercial codes in
Western European nations combined the best features of both rules, thus winding
up with different results. Id. Historically, European codes favored the good faith
purchaser in the interest of protecting the integrity of transactions in personal
property and to promote commercial security in post-plague Europe. See Collin,
supra note 160, at 22. At that point in European history, the rise of a merchant
class was transforming feudal Europe to a continent of urban centers of trade.
See Collin, supra note 160, at 22. Commercial codes were designed to favor the
good faith purchaser to encourage the rapid pace of economic development. See
Collin, supra note 160, at 22.
European civil law nations differ in the time the good faith purchaser is
required to possess a chattel before he acquires title. For example, in
Switzerland, the good faith purchaser of stolen property obtains title, even from
a thief, if five years pass from the time of the theft. See Schweizerisches
Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB] art. 932-934 (Switz.). The original owner must reimburse
the good faith purchaser for the purchase price if he reclaims possession. ZGB
art. 939. By contrast, German commercial law favors the original owner more
strongly. A good faith purchaser will acquire title to a stolen chattel if he
purchases and holds the chattel for a period of ten uninterrupted years following
the original owner's loss of possession without knowledge of any defect in title.
See Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 937 (Ger.). In France, a good faith
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on the other hand, the good faith purchaser generally cannot obtain
good title to stolen property. 6" Additionally, the rules governing

purchaser assumes title to stolen goods three years following the loss of the
original owner. See Code civil [C. CiV.] art. 2279 (Fr.). In Italy, a nation prone
to art theft, the law affords unqualified protection to the good faith purchaser
who acquires title immediately upon purchase. See Codice Civile [C.c.]. art. 1153
(Italy). See also Grover, supra note 160, at 1452 (describing further Italy's progood faith purchaser law).
164 Common law principles followed by the United States and England are
in conflict with European civil law regarding the transfer of stolen chattels. See
Gerstenblith, supra note 162, at 19. English and American law generally will not
grant title to a good faith purchaser for value of a painting previously stolen,
whereas the good faith purchaser often gets good title in Europe. See Grover,
supra, note 160, at 1448-49. The common law principle is based on the
centuries-old principle nemo dat quod non habet ("a seller of goods cannot
transfer a better title than he himself has"). See Grover, supra,note 160, at 1445.
Under English law, the good faith purchaser of a stolen chattel receives void title
and is not entitled to reimbursement from the seller if the original owner
replevies the property. See Richard Crewdson, Some Aspects of the Law as it
Affects Dealers in England, in INTERNATIONAL SALES OF WORKS OF ART 47, 50
(Pierre Lalive ed., 1985). Until 1994 a limited exception existed to the rule. The
antiquated law of "market overt" held that a good faith purchaser who bought
stolen goods in a public market or shop during daylight hours in the City of
London obtained good title. Id. at 50 (citing Sale of Goods Act, 1979, ch. 54
§ 22 (Eng.)). The market overt exception was abolished by amendment to the
Sale of Goods Act, effective January 3, 1995. See PALMER, supra note 38, at
359-60.
In the United States, both the common law and the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C.") hold that a thief cannot pass good title to a good faith
purchaser. See Grover, supra note 160, at 1447. The Supreme Court of the State
of New York has held that "the principle has been basic in the law that a thief
conveys no title as against the true owner." Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804,
819 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 246
N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). The U.C.C. states that, "[a] purchaser of goods acquires
all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer." U.C.C. § 2-403
(1995). Under the U.C.C., however, the good faith purchaser will be reimbursed
by the seller for purchasing a defective title if the seller is a merchant regularly
dealing in goods of such kind. See U.C.C. § 2-312 (1995). The U.C.C. states,
"[ulnless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods
of the kind warrants that goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of a
third person." Id. As this provision relates to dealing in art, "'merchant' includes
a commercial art gallery, an art auctioneer, and a private art dealer and excludes
a collector whose occupation is not related to art." See RALPH E. LERNER &
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statutes of limitation differ between nations regarding the time
within which one may bring a claim to recover stolen art and the
time at which the limitation period begins to run against the
owner.1 65 New York's statute of limitations period is particularly
77 (2d. ed. 1997). This provision seemingly
encourages a buyer to purchase goods from a reputable dealer where title may
be dubious, and provides dealers with economic incentive to make the greatest
JUDITH BRESSLER, ART LAW

efforts to ensure proper title.
165 There are significant differences in the substantive law between European
nations and the United States regarding the statute of limitations period within
which a claimant may sue to recover stolen artwork. The length of time the
dispossessed has to bring a claim for repossession is critical to the successful
retrieval of stolen property because statutes of limitation bar a plaintiff from
suing at the expiration of a set time period after a cause of action accrues. See
Gerstenblith, supra note 162, at 20. Because of the amount of time and difficulty
involved in locating a stolen work of art, the point at which the statutory
recovery period accrues is more critical than its length. See Gerstenblith, supra
note 162, at 20. It is on this point that the significance of the differences between
American and European law as to statutes of limitation affect the rights of the
good faith purchaser versus the rightful owner.
In many European nations, a cause of action accrues the moment the theft
occurs. For example, the statute of limitations period in France, is three years
and runs from the date of the loss or theft (though claims to stolen art objects
from pubic museums are not subject to the three-year limitations period). See
PALMER, supra note 38, at 360-62. French law effectively terminates the right
to bring a claim because if the defendant does not raise the expiration of the
statute of limitations as a defense, the court will do so on its own initiative. See
PALMER, supra note 38, at 360-62. Of course, the statute of limitations applies
only to the possessor who has acquired the artwork in good faith. See PALMER,
supra note 38, at 360-62. French policy reflects the common European approach
in choosing to promote commercial certainty. See PALMER, supra note 38, at
360-62. The law in Italy is even harsher with respect to the original owner's
right to recovery because it grants title to the good faith purchaser of stolen
property immediately upon purchase. See C.c. art. 1153 (Italy) (Italian law
affording unqualified protection to the good faith purchaser). Germany and
Switzerland allow the rightful owner a longer time to bring a claim for recovery,
but a cause of action still accrues upon the theft. See BGB § 937 (Ger.); ZBB
art. 932-34 (Switz.) (the length of the statute of limitations period in Germany
and Switzerland is ten and five years, respectively). Even the English legal
system has chosen to promote commercial certainty at the expense of the original
owner. The English statute of limitations of six years runs from the date of the
first good faith conversion and the period does not run anew with subsequent
good faith transfers. See PALMER, supra note 38, at 356-58.
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generous to the original owner.166 Whatever the resolution of the

By contrast, in the United States, the laws of many states delay the accrual
of a cause of action out of recognition that it usually takes an owner many years
to locate and make a claim for the stolen work. See Gerstenblith, supra note 162,
at 20. In general, American courts prefer a more flexible approach to the
restrictions of statutes of limitation, allowing for investigation of the merits of
the claims of the original owner and the good faith purchaser of the stolen
chattel, since both are often innocent parties and the thief has long since
disappeared. See PALMER, supra note 38, at 363. In most states, the length of
statutes of limitation are between two and six years from the time the cause of
action accrues. Gerstenblith, supra note 162, at 20. "However, no uniform rule
has been adopted and different jurisdictions use different tests to determine
whether, in a particular set of circumstances, time should be considered to have
run against the particular plaintiff-owner." PALMER, supra note 38, at 363. Some
states have embraced the "discovery rule," under which the limitations period
accrues when the dispossessed knew or reasonably should have known the
whereabouts of the artwork. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870
(N.J. 1980). Entitlement to the benefit of the discovery rule is dependent upon,
inter alia, whether a claimant "used due diligence to recover the paintings at the
time of the alleged theft and thereafter." Id. See also Hawkins, supra note 1, at
80. (the dispossessed is required to undertake a certain level of due diligence to
discover the location and identity of the possessor). California has codified the
discovery rule. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West 1981 & Supp. 1998)
(stating that an owner has three years to file suit to recover an article of "artistic
significance [upon the] discovery of the whereabouts of the article by the
aggrieved, his or her agent, or the law enforcement agency which originally
investigated the theft").
'66 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(3) (McKinney 1996). New York State has rejected
the discovery rule, instead applying the "demand rule" to govern the recovery of
stolen art. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430
(N.Y. 1991) (holding that "New York has already considered-and
rejected-adoption of a discovery rule"). See also Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
Under the demand rule, the three-year statute of limitations accrues upon demand
and refusal to return a stolen work. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429 (citing N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 214(3)). The significance of the Guggenheim decision is that New York
law does not require the owner to undertake a high level of diligence in
investigating the theft and making a timely demand. See Alexandre A. Montagu,
Recent Cases on the Recovery of Stolen Art - The Tug of War Between Owners
and Good Faith Purchasers Continues, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 75, 88
(1993). Under the equitable principle of laches, however, New York law allows
a court to find for the good faith purchaser if a lack of reasonable diligence on
behalf of the dispossessed in delaying a replevin claim unfairly prejudiced the
former when he purchased of the work. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431. By
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choice of law issue, the consequent litigation would certainly delay
the resolution of the controversy and cost the parties significant
sums of money.

167

Ironically, by allowing seizure of a temporarily exhibited work
of art in order to provide a means of return of possession to an
alleged rightful owner, such a policy actually could prevent a
potential claimant's opportunity for recovery. The likely result of
the Appellate Division's ruling will be that legitimate owners of
potential loans, not wanting to chance a rival claim of ownership
and a resulting seizure by New York authorities, will refrain from
168
loaning works whose ownership history cannot be determined.
The consequences of such an occurrence are three-fold. First,
museums may be unable to attract works essential to the integrity
of a particular exhibit, thus reducing the exhibit's strength.169
Second, a collector who refrains from loaning such a work denies
the rightful owner the chance to discover the existence of the work
or the identity of its owner. 17 Finally, the publicity generated by

considering a defense of laches, the demand rule, like the discovery rule, "allows
a court to examine the reasonableness of the actions of both parties and to bar
the claim when the possessor's purchase of the stolen art work would have been
avoided if the original owner had taken steps to provide reasonable notice of the
theft to potential purchasers." See Gerstenblith, supra note 162, at 23. But see
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 66-69 (noting that laches is inadequate to protect the
good faith purchaser).
167 For example, issues relating to the statute of limitations "almost always
inject an enormous amount of time and expense" into cases determining the
disposition of stolen art. See Kaye, supra note 2, at 32. In Kunstsammlungen Zu
Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), resolution of the
statute of limitation issues spanned eight years. See Kaye, supra note 2, at 32.
In Republic of Turk. v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), three years passed before the statute of limitation issues were
resolved. See Kaye, supra note 2, at 35.
168 Since the ownership history of many works of art is incomplete,
particularly those looted by the Nazis whose ownership records were never
recovered, lenders may legitimately fear potential claims. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text (describing the difficulties encountered in determining the
rightful owners of art looted by the Nazis following the end of World War 11).
169 This is precisely the consequence that the N.Y. Legislature intended the
ACAL to avoid. See supra Part I.B, discussing the issue further.
170 Claimants of the Schiele paintings discovered the whereabouts of the
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a major exhibition has the greatest likelihood of notifying a
previously unaware rightful owner of the whereabouts of his stolen
artwork.' A loan to an exhibit that might reveal to a previous
owner the location of his property is prevented if collectors are
hesitant to exhibit their works in major New York exhibitions
because of the potential for seizure.1 72 Ultimately, the ability of
a District Attorney to seize a loaned work could drive a stolen
work further underground.
Already, the concerns of Attorney General Lefkowitz have
materialized. 173 Soon after the District Attorney issued the subpoena, two lenders to the Pierre Bonnard exhibition at MOMA1 74
rescinded their offers to lend their works, citing uneasiness over the
Schiele seizures.171 The subpoena has impaired the statute's
effectiveness by frightening off lenders. This recent episode
demonstrates that the ACAL is necessary to ensure continued major
works as a result of the Leopold exhibit. See Lee Rosenbaum, Will Museums in
U.S. Purge Nazi-tainted Art?, ART IN AMERICA, Nov. 1998, at 37.
171 "Public exhibition and widely dispersed publication is a major source of
knowledge about the whereabouts of art. This constant addition of work to the
public and international marketplace of ideas and images is a fundamental
contribution toward the recovery of stolen artworks .... " See House Holocaust
Hearings, supra note 4, at 17 (statement of James N. Wood, Director and
President, Art Institute of Chicago).
172 See Rosenbaum, supra note 170, at 37 (by preventing the display
of art
due to the threat of seizure, a "well-meaning policy may end up shortchanging
not only the public but also the families seeking to recover lost works").
173 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney
General Lefkowitz's fear that an anti-seizure statute providing less than complete
protection will frighten-off lenders).
174 The Bonnard exhibition ran at MOMA from June 21 through October 13,
1998, after the Tate Gallery in London showed the exhibit from February 19 to
May 17, 1998. Raphael Rubinstein, MOMA's Bonnard Show Hit by Schiele
Fallout, ART IN AMERICA, June 1998, at 27.
175 The two paintings, both part of the exhibit while at the Tate Gallery,
were "Standing Nude" (1928) and "Gray Nude in Profile" (1936). Id. The owner
of the latter, a private collector, wrote a letter to MOMA citing the Schiele
seizures as his reason for withdrawing his painting from the exhibition. Id. This
is not the first time an international art exhibition was handicapped by an
attempted judicial seizure. Refusal to loan works to an exhibition following an
attempted seizure in the courts also occurred in France in 1994, prompting the
French anti-seizure statute. See supra Part I.D, discussing the French statute.
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public exhibitions in New York. As a matter of policy, the ACAL
should therefore be interpreted not to permit seizure of artwork
loaned to New York museums. As MOMA argued, "[t]he success
of New York's museums in presenting first class exhibitions on a
consistent basis is dependent, in part, on their ability to provide
assurances to art lenders that their works will be safely re' 17 6

turned."

III. EFFORTS AND PROPOSALS ENABLING MUSEUMS TO IDENTIFY
AND CLAIMANTS TO RECOVER STOLEN ART

As a result of rapidly improving means for museums to identify
and claimants to recover stolen art, a party seeking return of an art
object loaned to a New York museum for temporary exhibition
does not require seizure to bring a claim for repossession. Ownership disputes over artwork temporarily loaned to New York
museums rarely arise,'77 although claims to artwork looted by the
Nazis, and now in the possession of museums and other collectors
around the world, have increased. 178 Fortunately, a great interest
176In

re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served

on the Museum of Modem Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (Sup. Ct. 1998), rev'd,
mot. denied sub nom. People v. Museum of Modem Art, No. 28012-98, 1999
WL 145904, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 16, 1999).
177However, just under a year following the Schiele exhibit in which the
ownership of two paintings were challenged, a painting at a Claude Monet
exhibit at the Museum of Fine Arts ("MFA") in Boston was also claimed to have
been the property of a prominent French Jewish collector during the time of the
Holocaust. See Brian Macquarrie & Walter V. Robinson, MFA Moves to Verify
That Monet Was Looted, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1998, at Al. The French
national museum system has held the painting since 1950 when it was retrieved
from the possession of Adolph Hitler's foreign minister. Id. The MFA received
immunity from seizure from the federal government under the IFSA, and the
family of the original owner will likely make a claim for return of possession
from the French government when the exhibit returns to France. Id.
...See John Strand, Art and Restitution: An Interview with Constance
Lowenthal, MUSEuM NEWS, May/June, 1998, at 58. For example, the Egon
Schiele seizures at MOMA, a Matisse at the Seattle Art Museum, a Degas in the
private collection of a trustee of the Art Institute of Chicago, a Braque in Paris,
and two paintings by Frans Hals in Vienna have all been the subject of
ownership disputes. Id.
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in uncovering the provenance of works with histories connected to
World War II has accompanied the rise in claims to Nazi-tainted
art. 179 With this heightened concern, the art community is improving information systems to assist museums and collectors in
their efforts to avoid borrowing and purchasing stolen objects.18°
More importantly for the victims of art theft, these systems will
enable them to establish the validity of their claims.' 8 ' Various
art-concerned organizations have proposed several forms of
alternative dispute resolution to resolve such disputed claims of
ownership.18s Thus, the art and museum communities' sincere
interest, and developing ability, to return cultural property to its
rightful owners, combined with the budding alternative dispute
resolution methods, should enable claimants to recover works of art
loaned to New York museums for temporary exhibitions without
resort to seizure.
A. Current Efforts and Proposals to Enable Museums to
Avoid Borrowing Tainted Art
The recent discoveries of Nazi-looted artwork in the hands of
museums and other good faith purchasers suggest that museums
have a responsibility to undertake investigation of the provenance
of exhibited works. 83 Several members of the art community are

An intense interest has developed recently in "the fate of the art and
cultural property displaced as a result of [World War II] and other actions of the
Third Reich from the time the Nazi Party came into power in 1933." Johnston,
supra note 4, at 32. See also Vagts, supra note 77, at 232 ("In recent years there
has been an upsurge of interest in doing what can be done to right wrongs done
by governments in Europe in the 1930's."). Due to the Schiele Case and other
events, "public awareness has risen dramatically ....both in the art profession
and in the general public." See Strand, supra note 178, at 59-60.
180See Part uI.A, describing the creation of databases to record reports of
stolen art.
179

181 See

Johnston, supra note 4, at 34.

See supra Part III.B, discussing some recent alternative dispute resolution
efforts to settle restitution cases.
183 Several museum directors and officials recently testified before the House
Banking and Financial Services Committee as to the importance of and measures
museums are taking to establish that art objects in their collections are not the
182
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creating and upgrading computer databases and registries for
victims of art theft to locate or issue notice of their losses, and for
buyers to consult when purchasing artwork of unknown history.' This rise in increasingly accessible information can overcome the obstacles that often inhibit investigation of the ownership
history of works of art and should enable museums to avoid the
exhibition of artwork of questionable ownership. 185 If museums
do display borrowed artwork with a tainted ownership history,
access to this information will assist claimants in attempting to
recover such works.
The Holocaust Art Restitution Project ("HARP"), established in
September 1997 by the B'nai B'rith Klutznick National Jewish
Museum, is an example of a computer registry currently being
developed to help locate the lost art possessions of European Jews
during the Holocaust. 186 HARP will continually gather and

property of victims of art theft, particularly Holocaust victims. See House
Holocaust Hearings,supra note 4.
"4 The Art Loss Register is the largest computerized database of stolen or
missing art. See infra text accompanying notes 192-196 (describing the Art Loss
Register). Other organizations include the Holocaust Art Restitution Project,
International Research Center for the Documentation of Wartime Losses, the
Society to Prevent Trade in Stolen Art (STOP), and Trans-art International. See
House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 205 (statement of Ori Z. Soltis,
Director and Curator of the B'Nai B'rith Klutznick National Jewish Museum and
Chairman of the Museum's Holocaust Art Restitution Project).
185 Museums and art collectors in general have been hindered in their ability
to insure that acquired artwork was not stolen from Jewish collectors by the
Nazis. Johnston, supra note 4, at 33. Reliable information regarding ownership
history has sometimes not been available:
Although there are voluminous records of objects that were acquired
by the Nazis or otherwise lost during the war, as well as records
relating to the recovery and return of objects after the war, some losses
were never documented. Moreover, many records have been lost over
time and existing documents have been dispersed in public archives
and private files in numerous countries and in many languages.
Johnston, supra note 4, at 33-34. Now, with renewed attention to identifying
looted artwork still unaccounted for, more information is becoming available for
museums to consult. Johnston, supra note 4, at 34.
186 See House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 205 (statement of Ori
Z. Soltis, Director and Curator of the B'Nai B'rith Klutznick National Jewish
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provide information to reconstruct Jewish cultural losses at the
hands of the Nazis. 187 These efforts will result in a worldwide
computerized database that the art world can consult on-line to
trace the ownership history of artwork. 188 The database will
include not only information pertaining to stolen collections, but
also general information on the Nazi
assault on Jewish artistic and
189
Holocaust.
the
during
cultural life
The Commission for Art Recovery of the World Jewish
Congress, another recently formed restitution organization, is also
attempting to return lost art to Jewish families and to "recover
heirless Jewish property for the benefit of Jewish communities."' 9 ° The Commission intends to work in conjunction with
other organizations, such as HARP, to develop computer databases
to aid recovery efforts.' 9'

Museum and Chairman of the Museum's Holocaust Art Restitution Project).
187 See House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 205 (statement of Ori
Z. Soltis).
188 See House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 205 (statement of Ori
Z. Soltis).
189 See House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 205 (statement of Ori
Z. Soltis).
"9Johnston, supra note 4, at 49 (Commission for Art Recovery World
Jewish Congress Mission Statement, Mar. 6, 1998).
191 See Johnston, supra note 3, at 49 (Commission for Art Recovery World
Jewish Congress Mission Statement, Mar. 6, 1998). Constance Lowenthal,
Director of the Commission for Art Recovery of the World Jewish Congress, has
described how databases will enable Holocaust victims to recover artwork lost
to the Nazis:
Our database is going to help them in the following manner: We will
accept their recollections. As claims, they need to be validated. We
hope to be able to validate some of their recollections by putting in
[the database] Nazi lists of what was looted and by going through old
insurance policies that might have scheduled art items. Then-when
those things have all been compared-we may find that the victims'
recollections can be proven, by means that they did not have. Perhaps
they did not have the wherewithal to do international research, or a
grandchild never knew that his grandparents had an insurance policy.
But with databases these days, you can make so many cross-references
and you can search on so many different fields that we believe we'll
be able, if we know the grandparent's name, to find an insurance
policy with an art schedule that would confirm ownership. Then we
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The Art Loss Register ("ALR"), though not specifically linked
to remedying the wrongs of the Holocaust, provides a broad-based
computerized art registry of stolen art objects. The ALR is a
British, for-profit organization that manages a computerized92
database listing stolen and missing works of art and antiquities.
The ALR is the largest computerized registry of stolen or missing
art, consisting of 100,000 items, with approximately 10,000 objects
added each year. 193 Members of the commercial art community,
including auction houses, art dealers, and appraisers consult the
ALR. 194 According to its chairman, the activities of the ALR are
responsible for the recovery of nearly 300 art objects each
year. 195 Art theft victims can register their stolen objects with the
ALR, and buyers can consult the registry to investigate whether a
work has been reported as stolen.1 96 In February 1998, the ALR

will see if we can find the art in published records. It's easier with
prominent artists' work. Some art is completely private, but lots of it
is not. And then, if we can, we will help with private research that will
need to be completed before we can be sure that we are dealing with
a solid claim, in case something's been recovered in the interim and
then sold legitimately.
Strand, supra note 178, at 59 (interview with Constance Lowenthal).
192 House HolocaustHearings, supra note 4, at 362 (statement of Ronald
S.
Tauber, Chairman, The Art Loss Register, Inc.).
193 House HolocaustHearings, supra note 4, at 362 (statement of Ronald S.
Tauber).
'94 House HolocaustHearings, supra note 4, at 362 (statement of Ronald S.
Tauber). In February 1994, The Metropolitan Museum of Art announced that it
would consult the registry for all acquisitions over $35,000 in value. See
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 87-88. The J. Paul Getty Museum in Los Angeles,
California regularly employs the ALR. See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 87-88.
195 See House HolocaustHearings,supra note 4, at 362 (statement of Ronald
S. Tauber, Chairman, The Art Loss Register, Inc.).
196 See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 87-88. In 1994, ALR charged $65 to
register an item. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 87-88. The theft must have been
reported to a law enforcement agency and the value of the stolen work must
exceed $2,000. Hawkins, supra note 1, at 87-88. Potential buyers must pay $50
to search the registry, although law enforcement officials are not charged the fee.
Hawkins, supra note 1, at 88.
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offered to assist with
the development of a specialized new
97
Holocaust database. 1
An example of the success that databases such as the ALR can
achieve in aiding the return of stolen artwork to its original owners
was demonstrated just recently by the discovery of a painting that
was part of a loan to a Claude Monet exhibition at Boston's
Museum of Fine Arts. 198 The ALR research director used the
claimants' photograph of the Monet painting they were seeking and
matched it against the work on display in Boston.' 99 The claimants, descendants of a Jewish art collector living in France during
the Nazi occupation, are expected to make a claim for the Monet
when the exhibition returns to France. z°°
The federal government has also addressed the importance of
returning cultural possessions to victims of Nazi looting during
World War II. In February 1998, Congress enacted the Holocaust
Victim's Redress Act. 201 The law primarily applies to restitution
of gold and other monetary assets to Holocaust survivors and their
families. 20 2 However, one title deals with art and cultural property. Title II of the Act states:
It is the sense of the Congress that consistent with the
1907 Hague Convention, all governments should undertake
good faith efforts to facilitate the return of private and
public property, such as works of art, to the rightful
owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the

197 See House HolocaustHearings,supranote 4, at 362 (statement of Ronald

S. Tauber, Chairman, The Art Loss Register, Inc.).
198 See Macquarrie & Robinson, supra note 177, at Al (describing the
incident).
199 See Walter V. Robinson, Monet in MFA Show Believed to Be Nazi
Plunder,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1998, at Al. It must be noted that, although
a victory for the effectiveness of computer databases in recovering stolen art, the
ease of the ALR discovery also evidences the ease with which the MFA could
have discovered the provenance of the painting when considering whether to
borrow it. See id.
200 See Macquarrie & Robinson, supranote 177, at Al (noting the claimant's
plans for recovery).
201 Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15
(1998).
202 See Johnston, supra note 4, at 32.
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claimant during the period of Nazi rule and there is
reasonable proof that the claimant is the rightful own203
er.
The Act also authorizes the allocation of five million dollars "for
archival research and translation services to assist in the restitution
of assets looted or extorted from victims of the Holocaust. '2 °4
In addition to the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, some
members of Congress have introduced legislation that specifically
addresses "the obligations of museums to avoid acquiring or
exhibiting Holocaust-tainted objects and to return such objects to
their rightful owners., 205 Representatives Charles Schumer and
Nita Lowey introduced the Stolen Artwork Restitution Act of 1998,
designed to assist families in locating their lost and stolen art.2 °6
The bill seeks to codify a requirement that art purchasers perform
reasonable investigations into the history of title transfers for
objects they seek to acquire. 2 7 The bill allows an individual who
produces sufficient evidence that an artwork offered for sale was
stolen from the individual or his family, to request the seller or
purchaser to inquire into the ownership history of the work using
a computer registry.20 8 Congress will appropriate up to $5 million
to fund research organizations that help families find lost art.20 9
A further section of the bill includes a provision requiring the
attorney general to review the art collections of the federal
government to determine if any of its holdings have been stolen. 210 The bill also encourages all museums, auction houses and
203

Holocaust Victims Redress Act § 202, entitled "Sense of the Congress

Regarding Restitution of Private Property, Such As Works of Art."
204 Holocaust Victims Redress Act § 103(b), entitled "Fulfillment of
Obligation of the United States."
205 See Johnston, supra note 4, at 33.
206

H.R. 4138, 105th Cong. (1998). See also House Holocaust Hearings,

supra note 4, at 5 (statement of Rep. Charles Schumer).
207

See House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 5 (statement of Rep.

Charles Schumer).
208 H.R. 4138, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998). This section of the bill only applies
to artwork with a sales price over $5,000. Id. The Attorney General will establish
the standards that constitute "sufficient evidence." Id.
209 Id. § 8.
210 Id. § 4.
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foreign governments to investigate artwork in their possession to
determine whether they unknowingly possess stolen works.2"
B. Remedies Available to Victims of Stolen Art Beyond
Litigation
The art and museum communities are currently developing
alternative dispute resolution proposals2 1 2 intended to enable
claimants to recover artwork loaned to New York museums without
having to resort to seizure and subsequent litigation. When a
disputed claim of ownership for a work of art arises between a
good faith purchaser and the original owner, an alternative form of
dispute resolution such as arbitration or mediation is often a better
method of resolution than litigation.213 Alternative dispute resolution methods may avoid the all-or-nothing result to which litigation
subjects the good faith purchaser or the original owner, both
generally innocent of any wrongdoing. 2 4 Avoiding litigation can

211 Id.
212

§ 5.

The term alternative dispute resolution "refers to procedures for settling

disputes by means other than litigation; e.g., by arbitration, mediation, mini-trials.
Such procedures [] are usually less costly and more expeditious.. . " BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 78.
23 Decisions rendered by a mediator and an arbitrator differ in their
authority to bind the parties to the decision. In an arbitration proceeding, "a
neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at which both
parties have an opportunity to be heard. Where arbitration is voluntary, the
disputing parties select the arbitrator who has the power to render a binding
decision." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 105. Mediation is a
"[p]rivate, informal dispute resolution process in which a neutral third person, the
mediator, helps disputing parties to reach an agreement. The mediator has no
power to impose a decision on the parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 3, at 981. See Evangelos I. Gegas, Note, InternationalArbitration and the
Resolution of Cultural Property Disputes: Navigating the Stormy Waters
Surrounding Cultural Property, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 129, 151-54
(1997) (describing the advantages of alternative dispute resolution methods for
resolving cultural property disputes).
214 "The resolution of these problems is made the more difficult in view of
the fact that one of two innocent parties must bear the loss." Menzel v. List, 267
N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div.
1967), rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969). As one commentator has noted:
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also avert the attorneys' fees that can easily exceed the pecuniary
value of the disputed work.2 ' 5 Furthermore, avoiding litigation
can reduce the amount of time required to resolve restitution
cases. 2 16 In disputes over an alleged original owner's claim for
artwork in the possession of a good faith purchaser, those in the art
community prefer mediation because mediators are more familiar
than judges with the complex and emotionally sensitive nature of
restitution cases.21 7
Both museum directors and restitution organizations support the
development of mediation procedures specifically designed to
resolve restitution claims. For instance, the Association of Art
Museum Directors ("AAMD"), representing directors of 170 of the
largest art museums in North America, has established a special
task force to establish forms of alternative dispute resolution to
assist museums in resolving ownership disputes.218 On behalf of

When the former owner finally locates the art in the possession of [the]
good faith purchaser and commences an action against this innocent
purchaser for conversion or replevin, the courts are faced with the
unpleasant dilemma of allocating rights and burdens between these two
innocent victims of the thief, who is typically either unknown or
judgement proof.
See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 49-50. See also infra note 232 and accompanying
text (describing a recent settlement of an ownership dispute over an artwork
where the parties shared the loss that could double as a mediation proposal).
215 See Rosenbaum, supra note 170, at 37 (quoting a lawyer involved in
several restitution cases, "I am almost at the point of saying that if the art isn't
worth $3 million, don't go after it.").
216 See supra note 167 (describing the length of time courts require to decide
restitution issues).
2"7 One of the reasons the World Jewish Congress' Commission for Art
Recovery prefers mediation is that "the people who are guiding the negotiations
are really familiar with the constraints, the requirements, the needs, the ethics,
and the ways of the art world-which most judges are not . . . . While many
judges would love to have such a case, it's almost always their first." Strand,
supra note 178, at 60.
218 The Association has stated:
In order to achieve timely resolution of ownership claims relating to
art alleged to have been stolen immediately before, during, and
immediately after World War II, the Association strongly recommends
the creation of a mechanism for the fair resolution of these claims,
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victims of art theft, the Commission for Art Recovery of the World
Jewish Congress has stated that it recognizes that looted art will be
found in the possession of innocent purchasers, unaware of the art's
tainted history, and accordingly will offer mediation services in
ownership disputes involving art wrongfully taken by the
Nazis. 21 9 The Commission has offered to assist in the mediation
efforts proposed by the Leopold Museum,2 ° one of the few
specific manifestations of a mediation proposal regarding the
disposition of Nazi-tainted art.
In the Schiele Case, the lender initially suggested a mediation
proposal to resolve the ownership conflict upon the return of the
paintings to Austria. The Leopold Museum proposed the formation
of a fact finding tribunal to examine the claims of the two families

such as mediation, arbitration, or other forms of alternate dispute
resolution... reconciling the interests of individuals or their heirs who
were dispossessed of works of art with the complex legal obligations
and responsibilities of art museums to the public for whom they hold
works of art in trust.
Johnston, supra note 4, at 48 (Association of Art Museum Directors press
release, Feb. 3, 1998). It must be noted that the AAMD, which meets twice a
year, has been slow in developing specific mediation procedures. See
Rosenbaum, supra note 170, at 37.
219 Ronald Lauder, Chairman of the Commission for Art Recovery for the
World Jewish Congress, testified before Congress, suggesting that Congress
support a mediation mechanism for resolving disputes over looted art. See House
Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 193 (statement of Ronald Lauder). Lauder
offered the Commission's assistance to provide a panel of knowledgeable
mediators guided by principles that balance the needs of interested parties. See
House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 193 (statement of Ronald Lauder).
The panel would "develop solutions acceptable to good faith purchasers while
seeking the restitution of looted art for the families that have been deprived of
so much." See House Holocaust Hearings, supra note 4, at 193 (statement of
Ronald Lauder). Soon after the House Holocaust Hearings,a bill was introduced
in the House stating that Congress believes that "parties disputing the ownership
of stolen artwork should attempt to resolve their disputes by alternative means,
such as by arbitration, before seeking judicial remedies." Stolen Artwork
Restitution Act of 1998, H.R. 4138, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
220 See Walter V. Robinson, New York DA Bars Return of Austrian Art: Two
PaintingsAre Allegedly Nazi Loot, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1998, at Al.
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who alleged to be the rightful owners.22 The Museum promised
to adhere to the tribunal's findings.222 The families were dissatisfied by this proposition, insisting the paintings be kept in New
York as insurance that the tribunal's process would be fair.223
The Leopold Museum withdrew the offer upon the District
Attorney's subpoena.224 The Leopold Museum has said that it
would reinstate its fact-finding tribunal offer if the paintings are
returned to Austria. 225 The Austrian Government, in consultation
with the World Jewish Congress, would choose the members of the
reinstated tribunal. 6 However, the Museum and the Austrian
Government, not the tribunal, would decide the disposition of the
paintings.2 27

221See

Judith H. Dobrzynski, District Attorney Enters Dispute Over

Artworks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at B2.
222
223

224
225
226
227

Id.
Id.

See Dobrzynski, Ownership Conflict, supra note 13, at F32.
See Dobrzynski, Ownership Conflict, supra note 13, at F32.
See Dobrzynski, supra note 221, at B2.
See Dobrzynski, supra note 221, at B2. Since the Museum, not the panel,

has the final say in this proposal, it is understandable that the claimants would
reject the offer. However, it should be noted that political pressure on the
Leopold Museum from within Austria may affect the Museum's decision. In the
wake of the Schiele seizures, the Austrian government is currently undertaking
efforts to return art and cultural property stolen from Jewish families during
World War II. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Austria to Return Some Nazi-Seized
Art, But Disputes Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1998, at A6. The Austrian
Parliament approved a law enabling the return of hundreds of artworks seized by
the Nazis, which also covers furniture and other artifacts held by the Austrian
government. Id. A seven person advisory panel, including the Austrian "finance
and justice ministers, will review claims and offer advice on specific restitutions"
under the law. Id. Elisabeth Gehrer, the Austrian Culture Minister, has stated that
the panel will not consider the value of the works when making restitution
determinations. Id. Austria's ten state-owned museums have a number of works
stolen from Jews by the Nazis because of an art export ban preventing those who
fled Austria from retrieving all of their property. Id. Those works were generally
given or dedicated to state museums and galleries. See Jane Perlez, Austrian
Leaders Expect to Return Art From Nazis; Proposal Would Force Museums to
Give Up Items, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 1998, at A23. Some art
objects could not be returned to their rightful owners despite restitution efforts

following the War, and those works also reverted to state collections as
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In a second example of a dispute resolution proposal to avoid
judgment by trial, an ownership dispute over a painting looted by
the Nazis during the Holocaust was recently settled after protracted
and costly litigation, providing a potential remedy to parties
engaged in similar disagreements.228 Family members of the
Gutmanns, 29 major European Jewish art collectors, claimed
ownership of a Degas pastel that their ancestors sent to a Paris
warehouse for safekeeping during World War I1.230 The possessor, a trustee of the Chicago Art Institute, bought the work from a
New York gallery which had acquired the work from Europe and
displayed it several times. 23' Pursuant to a pre-trial settlement, the
possessor donated his share of the work to the Chicago Art
Institute, receiving a substantial tax write-off. The Institute
purchased the claimants' share, giving them a cash equivalent of
half of the Degas' value, as determined by a third-party appraiser.232 The Institute also benefited by adding a coveted artwork to
its collection. 3 Whether this settlement will establish precedent

"ownerless." Id. Half a century following World War 11, the Austrian government

is finally making concerted efforts to return Nazi-stolen works to their rightful
owners. In January 1998, the Austrian government ordered the national museums
to review the provenance of works in their collections. See Dobrzynski, supra,
at A6. The government hoped to return 400-500 items whose provenance had
been fully investigated by the end of 1998 to some 20 families. See Dobrzynski,
supra, at A6. However, some of the more valuable works whose ownership
histories are not yet clear, such as the Schieles seized by the District Attorney,
will not be automatically returned under the new law. See Dobrzynski, supra, at
A6. Restitution of these works will require legal resolution. See Dobrzynski,
supra, at A6.
228 Kevin M. Williams, Degas Settlement Lands In Uncharted Territory,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 43.
229 Friedrich and Louise Gutmann were the only major Jewish art collectors
in Western Europe whose collections were confiscated by the Nazis who also
were murdered in the concentration camps. See Walter V. Robinson, Holocaust
Victims' Heirs Given Share of a Degas, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1998, at Al.
230 Williams, supra note 228, at Al.
231 Constance Lowenthal, An Annotated Checklist of Cases and Disputes
Involving Art Wrongfully Taken During the Nazi Era and Its Aftermath, SC40
ALI-ABA 11, 14 (1998).
232 Williams, supra note 228, at Al.
233 Williams, supra note 228, at Al.
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is unknown, but it is a convincing example of an alternative to
trial.
In a specifically World War II-related alternative dispute
resolution proposal, Ralph Lerner, an attorney for the good faith
purchaser of the Gutmann's Degas, and chairman of the Art Law
Committee of the New York State Bar Association, has proposed
the formation of a restitution commission to compensate victims of
art theft at the hands of the Nazis. 234 The commission, which
would be a distinct governmental entity, would consist of art
historians and art experts and could be administered in part by the
Commission for Art Recovery.235 Under Lerner's proposal,
individuals with claims that works of art owned by their family
were stolen by the Nazis would present their case to the commission.236 If the commission finds sufficient evidence that the Nazis
stole the work and that the claimant is an heir, the commission
would award compensation to the claimant.237 The plan would
compensate claimants through federal funds under the Holocaust
Victim's Redress Act.238 Lerner optimistically suggests that
additional funds could be acquired from commercial art galleries
and auction houses which would benefit from increased stability in
239
the art market.

234

See Rosenbaum, supra note 170, at 37. Lerner believes the case law

demonstrates the need for a special commission to resolve ownership disputes
over art stolen during World War 11:
One thing is clear from a review of the cases: a matter involving a
claim for an artwork stolen during World War II will take between
seven and twelve years to resolve. The legal cost will most likely
exceed the value of the art, and the nondiligent claimant has little
chance of victory resulting in the return of the artwork, since most
claims will be barred by a statute of limitations or laches defense.
Lerner, infra note 159, at 36.
235 Id. See supra notes
190-191 (discussing the Commission for Art
Recovery).
236

237
238

See Lerner, supra note 159, at 36.
See Lemer, supra note 159, at 36.

See Lemer, supra note 159, at 37 & n.73. See supra notes 201-204 and

accompanying text (discussing the Holocaust Victim's Redress Act).
239

See Lemer, supra note 159, at 38.
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The benefit of the proposal to claimants would be the elimination of the need to surmount the burdens of proof a court would
require to prove the object stolen.24 ° Claimants would also avoid
the troublesome defenses of a statute of limitations and laches.24'
However, to the likely dissatisfaction of claimants, the disputed
work would always remain with the museum under Lerner's
proposal, and the commission would only award "reasonable
compensation, not the current fair market value of the stolen
artwork., 242 However, considering the costs and delay of litigating art disputes, claimants may be inclined to trade a rapid and
easier means of compensation for a lesser value.
It is too soon to tell whether the various alternative dispute
resolution procedures will succeed in providing dispossessed
owners of artworks with adequate means to bring their claims for
repossession without resorting to the courts. The Schiele Case has
not yet been resolved by the mediation proposal offered by the
Leopold Museum. However, the proposed involvement of the
243
Commission of Art Recovery of the World Jewish Congress,
and the mediation offer by the Museum itself, are encouraging
signs of a commitment to alternative dispute resolution procedures
to resolve art restitution disputes.
CONCLUSION

The New York Legislature enacted the Exemption from Seizure
provision of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law to insure that the
State would continue to lead the art world in the presentation of
major art exhibitions. The success of this objective is dependant on
the ability of museums to provide lenders statutory assurances of
complete protection for their loans from seizure. Prohibiting seizure
of artwork loaned to New York museum exhibitions through
comprehensive statutory protection will not block the ability of
Lerner, supra note 159, at 37.
Lerner, supra note 159, at 37.
Lerner, supra note 159, at 36.
See supra note 220 (describing the offer of the Commission of Art

240 See
241See
242 See
243

Recovery of the World Jewish Congress' to provide a panel of mediators to
resolve the Schiele dispute).
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victims of art theft to bring claims against lenders for the return of
their stolen property. In fact, if collectors are not discouraged from
loaning their works to major exhibitions, the publicity these shows
generate could notify a rightful owner of the location of his stolen
artwork.
The worldwide interest in righting the wrongs of the Holocaust,
coupled with the availability of information systems to track stolen
art, is enabling unprecedented claims for restitution of Nazi-tainted
art. Therefore, New York can provide lenders with the insurance
necessary to carry on premier exhibitions under the ACAL, while
victims of art theft at the hands of the Nazis remain protected. The
appellate division's decision to limit the protection under the
ACAL to solely civil seizures will not provide lenders with the
confidence that their loans will be returned. In order to provide that
confidence, the courts must interpret the ACAL to immunize loans
from seizure in both a criminal and civil context.

